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Abstract 
 Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. drastically altered the landscape 
for transnational securities litigation and the way that courts determine proper 
application of a statute concerning a transnational claim. The Supreme Court’s 
characterization of extraterritoriality under the Securities Exchange Act as a 
merits-based inquiry has led to a reexamination of limitations under other federal 
statutes that were previously thought to be jurisdictional issues. Significantly, 
Morrison created a roadmap for courts to follow when the extraterritoriality of a 
statute is brought into question. The key to proper application of a statute is to 
decipher the minimum U.S. contacts required to state a transnational claim. The 
tests developed addressing this inquiry are critical in discerning the boundaries of 
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The Supreme Court in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,1 
significantly altered the treatment of transnational securities claims. This article 
explores Morrison’s impact, including trends that may emerge and questions that 
remain.  The article commences with an analysis of this important decision.  
Thereafter, the widespread implications of Morrison’s merits-based 
characterization are addressed.  The article then considers how Morrison affects 
extraterritorial claims under other federal laws. Lastly, there is a detailed analysis 
of the types of securities claims that endure after Morrison.  The article’s focus is 
that Morrison will have longstanding effects on both U.S. federal securities and 
non-securities law. 
II.  Making Waves – Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. 
A. Pre-Morrison – The Calm Before the Storm 
Understanding the background of Section 10(b), which is the principal 
antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act, and its application to 
transnational securities fraud sets the stage for Morrison. Prior to Morrison, lower 
                                                          
1 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
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federal courts held that Section 10(b) was silent as to extraterritorial application.2 
When transactions with an international connection arose, courts considered 
whether there was subject matter jurisdiction under Section 10(b) to adjudicate the 
claim.3 In determining extraterritorial applicability, lower federal courts focused on 
policy matters such as the possible creation of a U.S. haven for those defrauding 
foreign investors and Congress’s intent to establish a high standard of conduct in 
securities transactions.4 Also significant, the Second Circuit attempted to discern, 
                                                          
2 See, e.g., In re CP Ships Ltd. Secs. Litig., 578 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2009); Morrison v. 
Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008); Robinson v. TCI/US West Commc’ns 
Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 905 (5th Cir. 1997). 
3 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).  See, e.g., In re CP Ships Ltd. Secs. Litig., 578 F.3d at 1312-13; Morrison, 
547 F.3d at 176; Robinson, 117 F.3d at 904; Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31 
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Cont’l Grain (Austr.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 413-14 (8th 
Cir. 1979). 
4 See, e.g., MCG, Inc. v. Great W. Energy Corp., 896 F.2d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 1990) (discussing 
the policy considerations of the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits where acts within the United 
States have affected foreign investors). 
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based on Section 10(b)’s underlying purposes,5 whether Congress desired to 
invoke the resources of U.S. courts in the transnational context.6  
With these considerations in mind, federal appellate courts, most notably the 
Second Circuit, developed what became known as the “conduct” and “effects” 
test.7 The conduct analysis inquired “whether the wrongful conduct occurred in the 
                                                          
5 The underlying purpose of Section 10(b) was to “remedy deceptive and manipulative conduct 
with the potential to harm the public interest or the interests of investors.” Morrison, 547 F.3d at 
170 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1838, at 32-33 (1934)). 
6 Morrison, 547 F.3d at 170 (referring to Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d 
Cir. 1975)). 
7 See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336-37 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(creating the conduct test); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206-09 (2d Cir 1968) 
(creating the effects test). For the purposes of this article, the pre-Morrison approach will be 
referred to as the “conduct and effects test.” However, it should be noted that not all courts 
performed a joint assessment of conduct and effects. Compare Itoba Ltd. v. LEP Group PLC, 54 
F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that a combination of the “conduct test” and “effects test” 
provides a better sense of whether sufficient U.S. contacts exist for a Section 10(b) claim) and 
Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665 n.8 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that a 
comprehensive approach does a better job of measuring U.S. contacts), with Robinson, 117 F.3d 
at 905 (explaining that either the conduct test or the effects test may “independently establish 
jurisdiction”) and Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 30 (offering the conduct and effects analyses as two 
instances where jurisdiction may be exercised over securities transactions that were not 
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United States.”8 The analysis applied to investors harmed abroad and varied 
depending on whether the investor was an American or a foreigner.9 When U.S. 
investors suffered losses abroad, the Second Circuit required that materially 
important acts performed in the United States “significantly contributed” to the 
harm.10  When foreigners suffered losses abroad, however, the acts occurring in the 
United States must have “directly caused” the harm.11 In the latter instance, acts in 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
consummated in the United States).  For a comparison of the regulatory systems in place in the 
world’s major markets, see Marc I. Steinberg and Lee Michaels, Disclosure in Global Offerings:  
Analysis of Jurisdictional Approaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 Mich. J. Int’l L. 207 
(1999). 
8 See In re CP Ships Ltd. Secs. Litig., 578 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2009); Morrison, 547 F.3d 
at 170. 
9 Bersch, 519 F.2d at 993. 
10 Id. For instance, in Bersch v. Drexal Firestone, Inc., the court concluded that jurisdiction 
existed where a prospectus emanating from the United States led to a fraudulent offering to U.S. 
investors abroad. Id. at 992. 
11 Id. See, e.g., Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1047-48 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding 




the United States that were “merely preparatory” did not satisfy the conduct test.12 
The Fifth,13 Seventh,14 and D.C. Circuits15 adhered to the Second Circuit’s 
approach, while the Third,16 Eighth,17 and Ninth18 Circuits embraced more relaxed 
standards. 
                                                          
12 Bersch, 519 F.2d at 992 (“While merely preparatory activities in the United States are not 
enough to trigger application of the securities laws for injury to foreigners located abroad, they 
are sufficient when the injury is to Americans so resident.”). 
13 Robinson v. TCI/West Communications Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 906 (5th Cir. 1997) (referring to 
the presumption against extraterritoriality and stating that policy arguments may provide reason 
for Congress, but not the courts, to expand federal jurisdiction). 
14 Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that the Second 
Circuit test provides an appropriate balance between the caution that should be exercised in 
finding extraterritorial application and the concern that the United States is not used as a base for 
fraudulent operations). 
15 Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31-32 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (considering the 
presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction and the “preserv[ation] of American judicial 
resources for adjudication of domestic disputes and enforcement of domestic law”). 
16 SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977) (asking whether “at least some activity 
designed to further a fraudulent scheme occurs within this country”). 
17 Cont’l Grain (Austr.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 421 (8th Cir. 1979) 
(inquiring whether “defendants' conduct in the United States was in furtherance of a fraudulent 
scheme and was significant with respect to its accomplishment”). 
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The effects analysis, on the other hand, asked “whether the wrongful 
conduct had a substantial effect in the United States.”19  The Second Circuit 
created the effects test based on the belief that Congress intended to protect U.S. 
investors who acquired foreign securities in the U.S. markets and to protect U.S. 
markets from improper foreign conduct impacting U.S. securities.20 For instance, 
in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,21 a case involving securities of a Canadian 
corporation, the Second Circuit exercised jurisdiction where the transactions at 
issue had occurred in Canada but impacted the value of common shares trading on 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
18 Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1983) (adopting the Eighth Circuit’s 
test in Continental Grain). 
19 Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2008). See also Robinson v. 
TCI/West Communications Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 905 (5th Cir. 1997); Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 30. The 
Seventh and Eighth Circuits considered whether the effects were foreseeable and substantial. See 
Kauthar SDN BHD, 149 F.3d at 665; Cont’l Grain (Austr.) Pty. Ltd., 592 F.2d at 416-17. 
20 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968) (rejecting the district court’s 
conclusion that the Exchange Act did not apply to transactions outside of the territorial United 
States). 
21 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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a U.S. exchange.22 The court asserted that application of Section 10(b) was 
“necessary to protect American investors.”23  
For over forty years, the conduct and effects test was applied and refined by 
the lower federal courts.24 Not surprisingly, some commentators criticized the 
unpredictable and inconsistent application of Section 10(b) under the test.25 In 
2010, in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the Supreme Court altered the 
course of federal securities law concerning transnational securities fraud.26 
B. The Storm Strikes – The Morrison Decision 
                                                          
22 Id. at 208-09 (explaining that fraud upon the foreign corporation reduced its equity and 
resulted in decreased stock value on U.S. exchanges). 
23 Id. at 206. 
24 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879-80 (detailing the history of the conduct and effects test). 
25 See, e.g., Erez Reuveni, Extraterritoriality as Standing: A Standing Theory of the 
Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Laws, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1071, 1075 (2010); 
Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities Class-
Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 567-68 (2009); Kun Young Chuang, Multinational 
Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need for the Clear and Restrained Scope of 
Extraterritorial Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 102 (2003); 
Margaret Sachs, The International Reach of Rule 10b-5:  The Myth of Congressional Silence, 28 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L . 677 (1990). 
26 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
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Morrison was a “foreign-cubed” case, or rather – a case where foreign 
investors sued a foreign issuer under the U.S. securities laws for securities 
transactions on a foreign exchange.27 In 1998, National Australia Bank Ltd. 
(National Australia) purchased HomeSide Lending, Inc. (HomeSide), a Florida-
based mortgage servicing company that received fees for collecting mortgage 
payments. Since Homeside would not receive fees once a mortgage was fully paid, 
the value of HomeSide’s right to receive such fees diminished as mortgages were 
paid off early. Three years later, National Australia had to write down the value of 
Homeside’s assets by $1.2 billion. National Australia explained that it had not 
anticipated the lowering interest rates and related refinancings. The prices of 
National Australia’s ordinary shares (which were listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange Limited (ASX)) and its American Depositary Receipts (ADRs)28 (which 
                                                          
27 Id. at 2894 n.11 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
28 As stated by the Third Circuit: 
An ADR is a receipt that is issued by a depositary bank that represents a specified 
amount of a foreign security that has been deposited with a foreign branch or agent of the 
depositary, known as the custodian.  The holder of an ADR is not the title owner of the 
underlying shares; the title owner of the underlying shares is either  the depositary, the 
custodian, or their agent.  ADRs are tradeable in the same manner as any other registered 
American security, may be listed on any of the major exchanges in the United States or 
traded over the counter, and are subject to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.  This 
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were listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)) subsequently fell. 
Australian and American investors then sued National Australia, HomeSide, and 
their insiders, alleging violations of Section 10(b).29 The plaintiffs claimed that the 
HomeSide defendants had manipulated the rates of early repayment as 
“unrealistically low” with the objective of inflating the ostensible value of the 
mortgage-servicing rights and that the National Australia defendants were aware of 
this deception.30  
The district court dismissed the claims by the American investor in National 
Australia’s ADRs for failure to allege damages.31 Since the American investor did 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
makes trading an ADR simpler and more secure for American investors than trading in 
the underlying security in the foreign market. 
Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 367 (3d Cir. 2005). 
By purchasing ADRs, a U.S. investor can gain ownership in the shares of a foreign 
company without the cross-border and currency inconveniences that the investor would 
encounter if he instead purchased the shares on a foreign exchange. See generally Joseph Velli, 
American Depositary Receipts: An Overview, Symposium: Entering the U.S. Securities Markets: 
Opportunities and Risks for Foreign Companies, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. S38, S39 (1994). 
29 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876. 
30 Id. 
31 In re Nat’l Austr. Bank Secs. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537 (BSJ), 2006 WL 3844465, at *8-9 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006). 
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not appeal, only claims by the Australian investors in National Australia’s ordinary 
shares traded on the ASX were further considered.32 The district court then granted 
defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, reasoning that 
the acts in the United States were, “at most, a link in the chain of an alleged overall 
securities fraud scheme that culminated abroad.”33 The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit affirmed, stating that the domestic acts did not “compris[e] the 
heart of the alleged fraud.”34 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.35  
As a threshold matter, the Court held that the extraterritorial reach of Section 
10(b) with regard to National Australia’s conduct was a “merits” question under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(6), not a subject-matter jurisdiction 
question under FRCP Rule 12(b)(1).36 This “merits”-based approach constitutes a 
radical departure from the subject matter jurisdictional rationale that had been 
overwhelmingly  embraced  by  the  lower  federal  courts.37   Perhaps  equally  as  
                                                          
32 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876 n.1. 
33 In re Nat’l Austr. Bank Secs. Litig., 2006 WL 3844465, at *8. 
34 Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 175-77 (2d Cir. 2008). 
35 Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 783 (2009) (mem. op.).  
36 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876-77. 
37 See Jared L. Kopel et al., 42nd Annual Institute on Securities Regulation: Current Topics on 
Securities Litigation, 1850 PLI/CORP 365, 391 (New York City, N.Y.) (Nov. 10-12, 2010) 
(“[T]he Court swiftly swept away a half-century of lower courts treating the issue of 
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significant, the Supreme Court rejected the conduct and effects test.38  
In determining whether the plaintiffs had stated a claim, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that unless Congress clearly expresses its affirmative intention “to give 
a statute extraterritorial effect,” then the statute has no such application.39 The 
Court asserted that lower courts had disregarded this presumption against 
extraterritoriality by creating the conduct and effects test to “discern” whether 
Congress would have wanted a statute to apply.40 The Court explained the 
difficulties of applying the conduct and effects test, such as having to decipher the 
degree of activity that transpired in the United States.41 After criticizing the 
unpredictable application of Section 10(b) to transnational cases under the conduct 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
extraterritorial reach of the securities law as a question of subject matter jurisdiction.”). See, e.g., 
Morrison, 547 F.3d at 171; Robinson v. TCI/West Communications Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 906 (5th 
Cir. 1997); Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1998). For further 
discussion, see infra notes 65-109 and accompanying text. 
38 130 S. Ct. at 2877-83.  
39 Id. at 2877 (commenting that various courts had been using this approach for decades). 
40 Id. at 2878. 
41 Id. at 2879. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986-87 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(distinguishing between U.S. and foreign investors); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017-




and effects test, the Court reasoned that applying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality in all cases provides stability moving forward.42  
Next, the Supreme Court considered whether Congress had legislated that 
Section 10(b) applies abroad.43 The Court held that the “general reference to 
foreign commerce in the definition of ‘interstate commerce’ does not defeat the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.”44 Congress’s observations, when setting 
forth the purposes of the Exchange Act, that “transactions in securities as 
conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets are affected 
with a national public interest” and that the “prices established in such transactions 
are generally disseminated and quoted throughout the United States and foreign 
countries” also failed to overcome the presumption.45 Lastly, the Solicitor General 
argued that Section 30(b) of the Exchange Act (which specifically authorizes the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to promulgate regulations having 
                                                          
42 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2880-81 (criticizing “judicial-speculation-made-law-divining”); id. 
at 2887 (specifically disapproving Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 
F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972), and Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), from 
which the Second Circuit developed its conduct and effects test). 
43 See Id. at 2881-83. 
44 Id. at 2882 (discussing the definition of “interstate commerce” in the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78c(a)(17)). 
45 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78b). 
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extraterritorial application in order “to prevent . . . evasion of the Exchange Act”) 
is evidence that the whole Exchange Act applies extraterritorially.46 Disagreeing, 
the Court concluded that Section 30(b) appeared to be “directed at actions abroad 
that might conceal a domestic violation.”47  
As an example of “a clear statement of extraterritorial effect,” the Court 
focused on Section 30(a) of the Exchange Act.48 That statute provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer . . . to make use of the 
mails or of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce for 
the purpose of effecting on an exchange not within or subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States, any transaction in any security the 
issuer of which is a resident of, or is organized under the laws of, or 
has its principal place of business in, a place within or subject to the 
                                                          
46 Id. (contending that “[this] exemption would have no function if the Act did not apply in the 
first instance to securities transactions that occur abroad” (Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae 14)). 
47 Id. at 2882-83. 
48 Id. at 2883. The Court remarked that this provision providing for “a specific extraterritorial 
application would be quite superfluous if the rest of the Exchange Act already applied to 
transactions on foreign exchanges. . . .” Id. 
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jurisdiction of the United States, in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe . . . .49 
The Court noted that even where a statute, such as Section 30(a), has some 
extraterritorial application, the presumption against extraterritoriality “operates to 
limit that provision to its terms.”50 The Court concluded that there was not a 
sufficient basis to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality for Section 
10(b).51 
Alternatively, plaintiffs argued that extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) 
was immaterial in this instance, as they only sought domestic application 
concerning the alleged financial manipulations and public statements of HomeSide 
that occurred in Florida.52  In response, the Court commented: 
For it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks 
all contact with the territory of the United States. But the presumption 
against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed 
                                                          
49 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(a) (2011). 
50 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883. 
51 Id.  (“In short, there is no affirmative indication in the [Exchange Act] that § 10(b) applies 
extraterritorially, and we therefore conclude that it does not.”). 
52 Id. at 2883-84. 
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if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is 
involved in the case.53 
The Court thus reasoned that the Exchange Act focuses on purchases and 
sales of securities in the United States, not on the location where the deception 
occurs.54 If indeed Congress had intended for the Exchange Act to apply to 
conduct affecting transactions consummated abroad, the Court stated that it would 
have addressed the subject of prospective conflicts with foreign laws and 
procedures.55  
The Court thereupon enunciated the “transactional test” for the invocation of 
Section 10(b).56 Under this test, for Section 10(b) to apply, “the purchase or sale 
[must be] made in the United States, or [must] involve[] a security listed on a 
domestic exchange.”57 Since the plaintiffs in Morrison did not purchase or sell  
                                                          
53 Id. at 2884 (emphasis in the original). 
54 Id. (applying the same mode of analysis used in E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 
U.S. 244 (1991)). 
55 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884. 
56 Id. at 2886 (describing the test as a “clear test” that would not interfere with foreign securities 
regulation). 
57 Id. The Court explained that the prologue of the Exchange Act supported the significance of 
the domestic exchange with its goal of “provid[ing] for the regulation of securities exchanges.” 
Id. at 2884. Moreover, the Court stated that it knew of no one who thought the Exchange Act 
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securities listed on a domestic exchange (and because the transactions at issue did 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
was meant to regulate foreign exchanges. Id. As for domestic purchases and sales, the Court 
referred back to Section 30(a) and (b), noting that, in each instance, the foreign location of the 
transaction “establishes (or reflects the presumption of) the Act’s inapplicability, absent 
regulations by the Commission.” Id. at 2885. The Court rejected the Solicitor General’s 
suggested test, which would have provided Section 10(b) coverage when the “fraud involves 
significant conduct in the United States,” primarily because the test lacked textual support. Id. at 
2886. The Solicitor General stated that this test would “prevent[] the United States from 
becoming a ‘Barbary Coast’ for malefactors perpetrating frauds in foreign markets.” Id. In 
response, the Court stated that there is no evidence that the United States was on this path, 
though “some fear that [the United States] has become the Shangri-La of class-action litigation 
for lawyers representing those allegedly cheated in foreign securities markets.” Id. 
 Note that in certain circumstances, the SEC may be able to institute suit under Section 
17(a) of the Securities Act when there are illegal offers to sell in the United States.  Because 
Section 17(a) extends to both offers and sales, a domestic offer (even when the transaction is 
consummated abroad) comes within Section 17(a)’s coverage.  See SEC v. Goldman Sachs & 
Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  Significantly, Section 17(a) is solely a 
government enforcement tool.  There is no private right of action under that statute.  See, e.g., 
Finkel v. Stratton Corp., 962 F. 2d 169 (2d Cir. 1992); Sears v. Likens, 912 F. 2d 889 (7th Cir. 
1990); Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co.,  688 F. 2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982).  For analyses of Section 
17 (a), see Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979); 




not otherwise occur in the United States), the Court concluded that the plaintiffs 
had failed to state a claim and accordingly affirmed dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6).58  
                                                          
58 130 S. Ct. at 2888. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment 
only. See generally id. at 2888-95 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Stevens stated 
that the judge-made rules in U.S. securities law were invited by Congress when it deliberately 
created, and subsequently left intact, an open-ended statute. Id. at 2889-90. He contended that 
Second Circuit case law had been thoughtfully developed over several decades, had gained the 
“tacit approval of Congress and the Commission,” and thus, ought to be favored by the Court. Id. 
at 2890-91. Justice Stevens criticized Justice Scalia for limiting his search for an indication of 
extraterritorial application to statutory text. Id. at 2891 (explaining that “all available evidence 
about the meaning” of a provision should be considered to effectuate Congress’ will regarding 
extraterritorial application). In any case, Justice Stevens argued that it was not appropriate to 
discard the conduct and effects test based on the presumption against extraterritoriality because 
the test turns on the presence of sufficient domestic contacts in transnational securities fraud, not 
the complete absence of domestic contacts. Id. at 2892 (emphasis added). Justice Stevens found 
that the statutory text in § 10(b) and § 30(a) and (b) – which the majority held had no clear 
indication of extraterritorial application – offered strong indication that the Act covers at least 
some transnational frauds. Id. at 2893-94 n.9. Justice Stevens then stated that the real problem 
with the majority’s opinion is that its test for domestic application is based on the belief that 
transactions on domestic exchanges, rather than the interests of the public and investors, are the 
focus of the Exchange Act. Id. at 2894 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 32-33 
19 
 
Overall, Morrison contains three significant holdings: the abrupt 
characterization of extraterritoriality as a merits question; the determination that 
Section 10(b) does not overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality (with 
the related rejection of the conduct and effects test); and the creation of the 
transactional test. Before the impact of these holdings is examined, however, this 
article addresses Congress’s response to the limitations pronounced in Morrison. 
 C. A Prescription for the Storm – The SEC-DOJ Dodd-Frank 
Amendment 
One day after the Court released its Morrison decision, Congress enacted 
Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(Dodd-Frank Act) authorizing extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Exchange Act 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(1934)). He pointed out that the transactional test created by the majority would leave an 
unsophisticated U.S. retiree who bought shares on a foreign exchange without a Section 10(b) 
remedy even if, on the basis of material misrepresentations, the purchase was induced in the 
United States by a U.S. subsidiary of the issuer. Id. at 2895. With regard to the facts in Morrison 
though, Justice Stevens concluded, “this case has Australia written all over it.” Id.  See generally 
Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Future of Extraterritorial 
Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 537 (2011); Elizabeth Cosenza, 
Paradise Lost: § 10(b) After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 343 (2011). 
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for actions brought by the SEC and the U.S. government, such as the Department 
of Justice (DOJ).59 Specifically, the statute provides:  
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction. – The district courts of the United States 
and the United States courts shall have jurisdiction of an action or 
proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission or the United 
States alleging a violation of the antifraud provisions of this title 
involving –  
(1) Conduct within the United States that constitutes significant       
steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities 
transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only 
foreign investors; or 
(2) Conduct occurring outside the United States that has a 
foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.60 
According to floor comments made by the statute’s sponsor, Representative Paul 
Kanjorski, Section 929P sought to nullify the presumption against 
extraterritoriality of the antifraud provisions of the U.S. securities laws with regard 
to government-brought actions by codifying the conduct and effects test repudiated 
                                                          
59 § 929P, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1865 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 




by Morrison.61 Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act mandated that the SEC perform a 
study and report to Congress within eighteen months on whether the test set forth 
in Section 929P should be extended to private actions.62 
Congress therefore wrote a prescription to cure the ills of Morrison in the 
government enforcement setting. Whether Congress in fact prescribed the proper 
medicine is uncertain. In Morrison, the Supreme Court held that extraterritorial 
application was a matter of substantive law, not subject matter jurisdiction.63 
Ignoring this rationale, Congress framed Section 929P in terms of jurisdiction. 
                                                          
61 CONG. RECORD, at H5237 (June 30, 2010).  Note that other criminal statutes may be invoked 
even if a subject transaction occurs abroad.  For example, the federal wire fraud statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 1343, extends liability to those who use U.S. interstate wires to execute a proscribed 
scheme or antifraud to defraud.  See Pascquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 371 (2005). 
62 § 929Y, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871. The SEC request for comment considers 
international comity, as well as the economic costs and benefits of including private actions for 
transnational securities frauds. Study on Extraterritorial Private Right of Actions, SECS. & 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, www.sec.gov/rules/other/2010/34-63174.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 
2012). The Commission issued its to report to Congress in April 2012. Study on the Cross-
Border Scope of the Private Right of Action Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, SECS. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/929y-study-
cross-border-private-rights.pdf (last visited June 20, 2012). See Part V of this article for a 
detailed discussion of the report and related public comments. 
63 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877. 
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Thus, it remains to be seen whether Congress’s efforts regarding SEC and DOJ 
actions will be effective.64 Section 929P is discussed further in the next section, 
which examines the consequences of treating extraterritoriality as a merits question 
and the implications of the abrupt departure from the historical treatment of this 
subject. 
III. Divergent Waves – Subject Matter Jurisdiction and the Merits 
 Extraterritoriality has traditionally been dealt with as a matter of subject 
matter jurisdiction.65 Morrison, however, held that this approach was not 
appropriate with regard to Section 10(b).66 The Court explained that inquiring 
about extraterritorial reach is really to ask what conduct is prohibited under Section 
                                                          
64 For a discussion on Section 929P as it relates to Morrison, see Richard Painter, Douglas 
Dunham, and Ellen Quackenbos, When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What They Mean:  
Initial Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 20 Minn. J. Int’l L. 1 (2011). 
65 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 n.22 (1993) (the Sherman Act); 
E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 247, 258-59 (1991) (Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964); In re CP Ships Ltd. Secs. Litig., 578 F.3d 1306, 1311-13 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act); Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 176 (2d 
Cir. 2008) (Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act). 
66 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877. 
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10(b), which goes to the merits of the claim.67 It stated that subject matter 
jurisdiction, on the other hand, concerns a court’s “power to hear a case.”68 The 
differences between a jurisdictional and a merits challenge are discussed below, 
followed by an exploration of the implications of this change beyond Section 
10(b). 
A. Assessing the Storm – Consequences of Jurisdictional and Merit-
Based Characterizations  
 Classifying an issue as jurisdictional or merit-based can impact when a 
challenge may be brought, who resolves the challenge, and the finality of the 
resolution.69 For example, a motion based on subject matter jurisdiction may be 
raised at any time,70 whereas a challenge based on the merits is forfeited if not 
                                                          
67 Id. 
68 Id. One commentator defined the difference as: “Merits ask whether the defendant’s conduct 
was legally constrained (by the Constitution or by act of Congress); jurisdiction asks whether a 
federal court has the power to enforce that legal constraint on the defendant’s conduct.” Howard 
M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 671 (2005). 
69 See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (discussing the consequences of 
characterizing a requirement as a subject matter jurisdiction issue or a merits-based issue). 
70 Id. at 514. 
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brought to the court in a timely manner.71 An instance where this timing may affect 
the outcome of a case is where a defendant raises an issue for the first time on 
appeal.72 Such a challenge will likely be rejected as untimely if the court 
determines that the issue is based on the merits, rather than that of subject matter 
jurisdiction.73  
 Additionally, courts have an independent obligation to determine that 
subject matter jurisdiction exists but have no such obligation regarding merit 
requirements.74 Thus, a court must inquire into such jurisdictional issues on its own 
                                                          
71 Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 130 S. Ct. 584, 596 (2009) (stating that a 
“claim-processing rule . . . is ordinarily ‘forfeited if the party asserting the rule waits too long to 
raise the point’”). 
72 See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 380 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2004), rev’d 546 U.S. 500 (2006) 
(affirming the district court’s decision to vacate a jury verdict for the plaintiff where the 
defendant raised an issue of subject matter jurisdiction for the first time after the trial). 
73 See, e.g., Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 504 (rejecting a challenge based on the merits of a claim 
because the defendant had failed to raise the issue prior to the close of trial). 
74 Id. at 514; also compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it 
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(h)(2) (“Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . may be raised: (A) in any 
pleading allowed or ordered under Rule 7(a); (B) by a motion under Rule 12(c); or (C) at trial.”). 
In determining that the ERISA requirement that an employer has fifteen or more employees was 
a merits rather than jurisdiction issue, the Supreme Court noted that the text of ERISA did not 
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accord. Characterization of an issue as jurisdictional or merit-based also influences 
whether a judge or a jury will resolve the dispute.75 Particularly, a judge may 
weigh evidence concerning contested facts to resolve a dispute concerning subject 
matter jurisdiction, whereas a jury is the trier of contested facts where an element 
of the claim is at issue.76  
 The finality of a resolution may also depend on characterization of an issue 
as jurisdictional or merit-based. A dismissal due to lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction typically is without prejudice, allowing a plaintiff to bring the claim in 
an appropriate court.77 However, if a claim is dismissed on the merits, the plaintiff 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
indicate that “Congress intended courts, on their own motion, to assure that the employee-
numerosity requirement is met.” Id. 
75 See id. (referring to Charles Wright and Arthur Miller, 5B Federal Practice & Procedure § 
1350, pp. 243-49 (3d ed. 2004)). 
76 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514. 
77 American Law Institute, Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26(1) (2011) (providing an 
exception to claim preclusion where “[t]he plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the 
case or to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the first action because of the limitations on 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts”). 
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would be precluded from arguing for a different outcome elsewhere.78 
Furthermore, the court’s characterization of the issue may impact other claims. An 
appellate court must dismiss the entire complaint if subject matter jurisdiction is 
found lacking.79 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, on the other hand, 
allows the court discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendant 
issues.80 
 These differences can potentially impact the outcome of litigation. With the 
exception of potential claim preclusion, the characterization of an issue as merit-
based appears to favor plaintiffs. When an issue is deemed a merits question, there 
is a limited time for challenges by defendants, no independent judicial obligation to 
ensure that merit requirements are met, and a jury to resolve disputes concerning 
contested facts. It should be noted, however, that a pretrial dismissal usually does 
not depend on characterization of an issue as jurisdictional or merit-based, as 
                                                          
78 See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (“[A] final judgment on the merits of an action 
precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised 
in that action.”). 
79 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514 (citing J. Moore etal., 15 Moore’s Federal Practice § 106.66[1], pp. 
106-88 to 106-89 (3d ed. 2005)). 
80 Id. (explaining that this discretion stems from 28 U.S.C. § 1367). 
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evidenced in Morrison.81 National Australia raised the issue of extraterritorial 
reach of Section 10(b) before trial and therefore had not forfeited a challenge based 
on the merits. The Court found it unnecessary to remand the case based on the 
Second Circuit’s dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) 
instead of dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), reasoning that 
the new labeling would result in the same outcome.82  
 In Morrison, the Supreme Court abruptly overruled decades of history 
treating Section 10(b) extraterritoriality as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The impact of this change on extraterritorial securities litigation under Section 
10(b) is monumental.  As discussed next, Morrison is already influencing the 
characterization of statutory requirements of other federal statutes. 
                                                          
81 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (“Since nothing in the 
analysis of the courts below turned on the mistake, a remand would only require a new Rule 
12(b)(6) label for the same Rule 12(b)(1) conclusion.”). See also ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. Int’l 
Bhd. of Teamsters, 2011 WL 2623347 (8th Cir. July 6, 2011) (“It is true that an appellate court 
may treat a Rule 12(b)(1) issue as a Rule 12(b)(6) issue.”); Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 
629 F.3d 992, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that remand was unnecessary where the district 
court incorrectly discussed an ERISA matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than 
failure to state a claim). 
82 See, e.g., Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (citing Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 
U.S. 354, 359, 381-84 (1959)). 
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 B.  Riding the Waves – Implications Beyond Section 10(b) 
 The jurisdiction provision for the Exchange Act states:  
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of violations of [the Exchange Act] or the rules and 
regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law 
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by [the Exchange Act] 
or the rules and regulations thereunder. . . . 83  
There is thus no mention of extraterritoriality or any requirements regarding the 
scope of Section 10(b) in the foregoing statute. In Morrison, the Court stated that 
to establish subject matter jurisdiction, a plaintiff need only allege a violation of 
the Exchange Act.84  Other federal statutes with similarly worded jurisdictional 
provisions85 would be expected to yield results identical to Morrison in the future, 
that is – characterization of an issue regarding the statute’s scope as a merits 
question.  
                                                          
83 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) (2011). 
84 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78aa in finding that the District Court 
had jurisdiction to determine whether Section 10(b) applied to National Australia’s conduct). 
85 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (2011) (Title VII) (“Each United States district court and 
each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have 
jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter.”).  
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 Prior to Morrison, several circuit courts treated the requirements of the 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA), which limits the 
extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act, as a jurisdictional issue.86 The Seventh 
Circuit noted that for six decades prior to enactment of the FTAIA, courts had 
treated application of the Sherman Act with regard to foreign markets as a matter 
of subject matter jurisdiction and that legislation should “be read to conform with 
Supreme Court precedent.”87 Extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act, without 
regard to the FTAIA, has also been characterized as a matter of subject matter 
jurisdiction.88 Justice Scalia strongly dissented to this characterization in Hartford 
Fire Insurance Company v. California, insisting that, “the extraterritorial reach of 
the Sherman Act . . . has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the courts. It is a 
question of substantive law turning on whether, in enacting the Sherman Act, 
                                                          
86 See, e.g., United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379, F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2004); United 
Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 952 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Den Norske 
Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 425 (5th Cir. 2001). Dissenting in United 
Phosphorus Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co., Judge Diane Wood argued that the FTAIA language 
that the Sherman Act “shall not apply” to certain foreign conduct did not speak to the court’s 
power to consider the case. 322 F.3d at 954-55. 
87 United Phosphorus Ltd., 322 F.3d at 951.  
88 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 n.22 (1993). 
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Congress asserted regulatory power over the challenged conduct.”89 After 
Morrison, Justice Scalia’s approach may well emerge victorious.90 
 Extraterritoriality is not the first issue to generate confusion over whether a 
decision based on jurisdiction or the merits is appropriate. Until the Supreme Court 
resolved the issue in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,91 there was a deep circuit split 
regarding whether the definition of an employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 was a jurisdictional or a merits issue.92 The Fifth Circuit in Arbaugh 
held that fifteen or more employees were necessary to establish subject matter 
jurisdiction of a Title VII claim.93  The Supreme Court rejected this 
characterization and stated that the requirement was a merits question.94 
                                                          
89 Id. at 813 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
90 Indeed, the Third Circuit recently held that the FTAIA is a merits-based limitation, rather than 
a jurisdictional one. Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 468-69 
(3d Cir. 2011) (discussing Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), and 
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006)). 
91 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
92 Wasserman, supra note 68, at 657 n.65 (2005) (listing cases from eight different circuit courts 
over the past three decades). 
93 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 380 F.3d 219, 224 (5th Cir. 2004). 
94 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510 (2006). Since the plaintiff moved for dismissal 
based on subject matter jurisdiction for the first time on appeal, characterization of the issue as a 
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Additionally, since Morrison, it has been contended that certain requirements 
under other statutes, such as ERISA95 and the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),96 should 
be characterized as merits questions. 
 All this is not to say that an issue that goes to the scope of the conduct 
covered under the statute can never be a jurisdictional issue. The Supreme Court 
has stated that Congress has the power to make a threshold limitation on a statute’s 
scope jurisdictional by clearly identifying it as such.97 To determine whether 
Congress has exercised this power, the Court has focused on whether the threshold 
appears in the jurisdictional provision of the statute or if it is accompanied by any 
jurisdictional language.98 For example, the amount-in-controversy threshold for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
merits question resulted in reinstatement of the jury’s decision against the plaintiff because there 
was not a timely motion to dismiss on the merits. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 2006 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 9279 (5th Cir. Apr. 13, 2006). 
95 Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2010) (regarding whether an 
employment plan was subject to ERISA). 
96 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2011 WL 2652384 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2011); Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268, 272 n.1 (2d Cir. 2011) (Circuit Judge Leval, dissenting). 
97 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515. 
98 See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Eng’rs, 130 S. Ct. 584. 597-99 (2009) (analyzing the 
conferencing requirement under the Railway Labor Act); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515 (considering 
the employee-numerosity requirement under Title VII). 
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diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is an example of a 
requirement deemed jurisdictional by Congress.99 By contrast, in Union Pacific 
Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,100 the Supreme Court held 
that a conferencing requirement under the Railway Labor Act (RLA) was not 
jurisdictional because it was “not moored” to the section of the RLA establishing 
jurisdiction.101  
 Had the conduct and effects test not been rejected in Morrison for 
substantive reasons, the Dodd-Frank amendment arguably would have been 
successful in converting the test into a jurisdictional requirement for cases brought 
by the SEC and DOJ. Notably, Section 929P speaks extensively in jurisdictional 
language.102 However, in light of the substantive limitations set forth in Morrison, 
it may well be that the amendment futilely attempts to grant jurisdiction beyond the 
substantive reach of the Exchange Act.103  
                                                          
99 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514-15. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 provides: “The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceed the sum or value 
of $75,000 . . . .” 
100 130 S. Ct. 584 (2009). 
101 Id. at 597-99 (commenting that the two provisions were in separate sections). 
102 See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text. 
103 See, e.g., Painter et al., supra note 64, at 4. 
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 A similar argument was made with regard to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)104 
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.105 The defendant argued that the ATS was “stillborn” 
since the jurisdictional grant did not have a corresponding cause of action.106 The 
Supreme Court found that federal common law at the time the ATS was passed in 
1789 provided substantive law to support the jurisdictional grant.107 In its decision, 
the Court considered evidence that Congress intended the statute to have 
immediate effect upon enactment.108  
 While Morrison clearly finds substantive law lacking for the conduct and 
effect test, courts may draw from Sosa and proceed based on Congress’s intent to 
overrule Morrison, taking into account the brief time frame in which Congress had 
to respond to Morrison and the lengthy history of courts treating extraterritorial 
application as a matter of jurisdiction. Given the uncertainty surrounding Section 
929P though, Congress (at least in the government enforcement context) should 
                                                          
104 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011). In its entirety, ATS states: “The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.” Id. 
105 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
106 Id. at 714. 




expand the substantive reach of Section 10(b) to help ensure that the law is 
interpreted as Congress intended.109 
 All in all, a significant impact of the Morrison declaration that Section 10(b) 
extraterritoriality is a merits question is with respect to the characterization of the 
statutory requirements of other statutes. Future characterization of 
extraterritoriality appears particularly susceptible to the reasoning in Morrison, 
though Congress’s ability to make a requirement jurisdictional means that courts 
cannot assume that a merits question under one statute is necessarily a merits 
question under another statute. As for the future of the Dodd-Frank amendment, 
the potential problems seem to lie in the substantive limitations of the Exchange 
Act, not with Congress’s jurisdictional characterization of extraterritoriality.  The 
impact of Morrison’s extraterritoriality analysis on other federal law is examined 
next. 
IV. Wave Impact – Extraterritoriality with Regard to Other Federal Law 
                                                          
109 Interestingly, the SEC has not relied on the Dodd-Frank amendment in post-Morrison cases. 
See SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 2011 WL 2305988 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2011); SEC v. Credit 
Bancorp, Ltd., 738 F. Supp. 2d 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Since the less strict conduct and effects test 
should make it easier for the SEC to bring Section 10(b) actions, perhaps the SEC harbors doubts 
about its effectiveness.  
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In Morrison, the Supreme Court stated that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is a canon of construction that applies generally to the legislation 
of Congress.110 The Court explained that this presumption rests on the perception 
that Congress usually legislates with regard to domestic, rather than foreign, 
concerns.111 Thus, unless Congress clearly indicates that a statute has 
extraterritorial reach, courts should presume the statute does not apply abroad.112 
While Morrison is definitely not the first Supreme Court case to promulgate that 
general concept,113 its outcome may unleash a new wave of defendants challenging 
the extraterritorial application of federal statutes. To gain an understanding of how 
Morrison might impact other federal law, this section examines the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), a statute whose 
                                                          
110 Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 2878. 
113 See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993) and E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil 
Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (both quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949): 
“[L]egislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”). 
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extraterritoriality is unsettled, and the Lanham Act, a statute whose extraterritorial 
application was reinforced by Morrison.114  
A. Rogue Wave – RICO 
Prior to Morrison, several circuit courts adopted the conduct and effects test 
to determine the extraterritorial application of RICO.115 For example, the Ninth 
Circuit, upon finding that RICO is silent as to extraterritorial application, reasoned 
                                                          
114 These two statutes were chosen for discussion because each had case law discussing 
extraterritoriality prior to Morrison. Additionally, an analysis of RICO and the Lanham Act 
allows for comparison of a statute that likely does not overcome the presumption against 
extraterrioriality with one that does. For some of the other statutes whose extraterritoriality has 
been examined after Morrison, see Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, Nos. 02-56256, 02-56390, 09-56381, 
2011 WL 5041927, at *4--5 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2011) (Alien Tort Statute); Tianrui Group Co. Ltd. 
v. Int’l Trade Com’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1328-32 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 11, 2011) (Tariff Act); United 
States v. Elie, No. S3 10 CRIM. 0336 LAK, 2012 WL 383403, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2010) 
(Internet Gambling Business Act of 1970); and Souryal v. Torres Advanced Enterprise Solutions, 
LLC, No. 1:11CV643, 2012 WL 405048, at *5-7 (E.D. Va. Feb. 6, 2012) (Family and Medical 
Leave Act of 1993). 
115 See Poulos v. Caesars World, Inc., 379 F.3d 654, 663 (9th Cir. 2004); Liquidation Com’n of 
Banco Intercontinental, S.A. v. Renta, 530 F.3d 1339, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2009). See also Kauthar SDN BHD v. 
Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 671-72 (7th Cir. 1998) (opting to save determination on the 
extraterritorial scope of RICO for another day). 
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that the securities laws’ conduct and effects test was useful in determining RICO’s 
extraterritorial application.116  The Eleventh Circuit, after rejecting the assertion 
that RICO does not apply extraterritorially without an explicit statement to that 
effect, also adopted the conduct and effects test.117 In United States v. Philip 
Morris USA Inc.,118 the District of Columbia Circuit applied the effects test in 
determining that RICO applied where a British tobacco company was accused of 
deceiving U.S. consumers about the risks of smoking cigarettes.119 However, 
unlike the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, the D.C. Circuit held that regulation of 
foreign conduct in such cases did not involve extraterritorial application, as the 
United States has a “legitimate interest in protecting its citizens within its 
borders.”120 The court stated that the presumption against extraterritoriality did not 
apply when a statute meets the effects test; rather, RICO would only have “true” 
extraterritorial reach if it were able to reach “foreign conduct that has no conduct 
on the United States.”121  
                                                          
116 Poulos, 379 F.3d at 663. 
117 Liquidation Com’n of Banco Intercontinental, S.A., 530 F.3d at 1351-52. 
118 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
119 Id. at 1105-06, 1130. 
120 Compare id. at 1130, with Poulos, 379 F.3d at 663 and Liquidation Com’n of Banco 
Intercontinental, S.A., 530 F.3d at 1351-52. 
121 Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d at 1130 
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These pre-Morrison analyses likely do not hold up today. In Morrison, the 
Supreme Court explained that the conduct and effects test stemmed from courts’ 
misguided attempts to discern whether Congress would have wanted to apply 
Section 10(b) even though the statute was silent as to extraterritorial application.122 
Without clear statutory indication that RICO was meant to apply extraterritorially, 
there is no reason to think that this test would be any more appropriate in a RICO 
case. Indeed, based on Morrison and the presumption against extraterritoriality, 
several courts have already concluded that RICO does not apply 
extraterritorially.123 One district court, for example, specifically rejected the 
conduct and effects test with regard to RICO “for the same reasons” as in 
Morrison.124 
The D.C. Circuit’s assertion that the effects test is a test for domestic, rather 
than extraterritorial, application is an interesting approach to RICO. While that 
                                                          
122 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878-81 (2010). 
123 See, e.g., Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2010); Sorota v. 
Sosa, No. 11-80897-CV, 2012 WL 313530, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2012); CGC Holdings Co., 
LLC v. Hutchens, No. 11-CV-01012-RBJ-KLM, 2011 WL 5320988, at *14 (D. Colo. Nov. 1, 
2011); In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883, 913 (C.D. Cal. 2011); U.S. v. Philip 
Morris USA, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28-29 (D.D.C. 2011).  




particular test may not survive Morrison, a workable test for domestic application 
of RICO involving foreign contacts might yet be developed. In Morrison, by 
creating the transactional test, the Supreme Court prescribed the domestic contacts 
necessary to establish a Section 10(b) claim.  
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently had the opportunity to 
develop a minimum-domestic-contacts test for RICO claims but declined. In Norex 
Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Industries, Inc.,125 Norex Petroleum Ltd. (Norex), a 
Canadian corporation, alleged that the primarily foreign group of defendants was 
involved in a widespread racketeering conspiracy aimed at taking over the Russian 
oil industry.126 Norex claimed that defendants violated RICO by laundering money 
and committing other acts in furtherance of this scheme in the United States.127 
Defendants argued that Norex had failed to raise a RICO claim since the principal 
actions had taken place outside of the United States.128 The Second Circuit held 
                                                          
125 631 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2010). 
126 Id. at 31. The defendants were primarily foreign actors, though several were U.S. citizens or 
conducted business in the United States. Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 304 F. 
Supp. 2d 570, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev’d, 304 F.3d 29 (2010). 
127 Norex Petroleum Ltd., 631 F.3d at 31. Specifically, Norex asserted that U.S. and foreign 
banking facilities concealed financial transactions to divert revenues on behalf of defendants. 
Norex Petroleum Ltd., 304 F. Supp. 2d at 573. 
128 Norex Petroleum Ltd., 631 F.3d at 31. 
40 
 
that, based on Morrison, RICO did not have extraterritorial application.129 In its 
analysis, the court stated that Morrison created a “bright line rule” for determining 
a statute’s extraterritorial application: “[A]bsent a clear Congressional expression 
of a statute's extraterritorial application, a statute lacks extraterritorial reach.”130  
After noting that Second Circuit precedent held that “RICO is silent as to 
any extraterritorial application,” the court rejected each of Norex’s arguments to 
the contrary.131 Particularly, it found that: RICO’s broad language defining 
commerce132 did not indicate extraterritorial application;133 the extraterritorial 
reach of RICO’s predicate acts such as wire fraud did not extend beyond the terms 
                                                          
129 Id. at 33. The separate mail and wire fraud statutes have extraterritorial application, however, 
and should be available for criminal cases where a RICO claim is unavailable since RICO does 
not apply extraterritorially. Kopel et al., supra note 37, at 398. 
130 Norex Petroleum Ltd., 631 F. 3d at 32 (citing Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 
S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010)). 
131 631 F. 3d at 33. 
132 RICO prohibits the use or investment of racketeering proceeds affecting “interstate or foreign 
commerce.” 42 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2011). The statute also prohibits a person from gaining or 
maintaining, through racketeering activities, an interest in an enterprise affecting “interstate or 
foreign commerce.” Id. § 1962(b). 
133 Norex Petroleum Ltd., 631 F.3d at 33 (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882) (“[W]e have 
repeatedly held that even statutes that contain broad language in their definitions of commerce do 
not apply abroad.”). 
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of those provisions to RICO as a whole;134 and alleging some occurrence of 
domestic conduct was not enough to support domestic application of RICO.135 
Concluding that the slim domestic contacts alleged by Norex were not enough to 
support extraterritorial application of RICO, the court dismissed the claims under 
FRCP Rule 12(b)(6).136 The court declined to discuss what domestic contacts 
would have supported RICO application despite the foreign contacts.  
                                                          
134 Id.  (quoting  Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882-83)  (“[W]hile  Section 30(b)  of  the Exchange 
Act . . . can be interpreted to apply abroad, ‘the presumption against extraterritoriality operates to 
limit that provision to its terms.”). 
135Id. (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884) (“[I]t is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial 
application that lacks all conduct with the territory of the United States.”). 
136 Id. Before the Morrison decision, the Second Circuit would have also engaged in an inquiry 
of whether Congress “would have intended that federal courts should be concerned with specific 
international controversies.” See N. S. Fin. Corp. v. Al-Turki, 100 F.3d 1046, 1051 (2d Cir. 
1996), overruled by Norex Petroleum Ltd., 631 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2010). Though the Second 
Circuit never settled on a specific test under this inquiry for the extraterritorial application of 
RICO, it indicated that it might have found a variation of the securities laws’ effects test 
appropriate. Id. at 1052 (commenting that the effects-oriented approach used in antitrust cases 
might be preferred in RICO cases as RICO’s substantive law and damages has similarities with 
parts of the Sherman Act). 
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Subsequently, as discussed below, a few district courts have considered this 
question.137 
In Morrison, the Supreme Court indicated that any test for domestic 
application should reflect the focus of the statute,138 prompting several courts to 
perform a statutory analysis of RICO.139 According to its statutory language, RICO 
does not criminalize racketeering activities standing alone – those are criminalized 
under other statutes; rather, the statute criminalizes racketeering activities in 
                                                          
137 See, e.g., In re Le-Nature’s, Inc., No. 9-1445, 2011 WL 2112533, slip op. at *3 (W.D. Pa. 
May 26, 2011); In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883, 914-15 (C.D. Cal. 2011); 
European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 02-CV-5771 (NGG)(VVP), 2011 WL 843957, at *5-6 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2011) (mem. op.); Cedeno v. Intech Group, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 472-73 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
138 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. at 2884 (examining the Exchange Act to 
identify the focus of congressional concern). 
139 See, e.g., In re Le-Nature’s, Inc., 2011 WL 2112533, slip op. at *3; In re Toyota Motor Corp., 




connection with an enterprise.140 This has led several courts to conclude that the 
focus of RICO is on the enterprise.141  
The statute’s purpose, which is stated as “the elimination of the infiltration 
of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in 
interstate commerce,”142 supports this conclusion. The reference to interstate 
commerce suggests that Congress’s principal concern was focused on the 
corruption of domestic enterprises.143 It can be argued that Congress would have 
                                                          
140 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2011). 
141 See, e.g., Sorota v. Sosa, No. 11-80897-CV, 2012 WL 313530, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2012); 
In re Le-Nature’s, Inc., 2011 WL 2112533, slip op. at *3; In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. 
Supp. 2d at 914; European Cmty., 2011 WL 843957, at *5; Cedeno, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 473. To 
determine the location of the enterprise in a RICO case, some courts have employed the “nerve 
center” test, which inquires as to where the decision-makers are. See Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v. 
Seamaster Logistics, Inc., No. 11-2861 SC, 2012 WL 1657108, *4-5 (N.D.  Cal. May 10, 2012); 
European Cmty., 2011 WL 843957, at *5-6. Not all courts, however, have agreed that the 
enterprise is the focus of RICO. See, e.g., CGC Holding Co., LLC v. Hutchens, No. 11-CV-
01012-RBJ-KLM, 2011 WL 5320988, at *14 (D. Colo. Nov. 1, 2011) (finding that “racketeering 
activity” is the focus of RICO). 
142 Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Report on Organized Crime Control Act of 1969, S. REP. NO. 
91-617, at 76. 
143 Additionally, in the prologue of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, the Act through 
which RICO was enacted, Congress published findings that organized criminal activities in the 
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addressed possible conflicts with foreign laws and procedures if RICO had been 
intended to apply to corruption abroad.144 Thus, U.S. citizens harmed by a foreign 
enterprise may not have recourse under RICO.145  
Undoubtedly, Morrison will continue to be mentioned in discussions of 
statutes like RICO whose extraterritoriality is not yet settled.146 A conclusion that a 
statute does not have extraterritorial reach is likely not enough to rule on a claim 
though, as shown by the creation of the Morrison transactional test for domestic 
application of Section 10(b). Next, an analysis of the Lanham Act reveals similar 
shortcomings where a statute has been deemed to have extraterritorial reach. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
United States weaken the U.S. economy, “seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, 
threaten the domestic security, and undermine general welfare” of the United States and its 
citizens. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923, Statement of Findings and Purpose (emphasis 
added). In Morrison, the Court referred to the prologue of the Exchange Act as supporting the 
importance of the domestic exchange in § 10(b). Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884-85. 
144 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885 (refusing to find that the Exchange Act reaches foreign 
exchanges and transactions because Congress would have addressed conflicts with foreign laws 
and procedures if the statute were intended to apply abroad) 
145 This outcome would not be unlike the potential harsh realities of the § 10(b) transactional test. 
See infra notes 192-300 and accompanying text. 
146 See, e.g., NewMarket Corp. v. Innospec, Inc., No. 3:10CV503-HEH, 2011 WL 1988073, at 
*6-8 (E.D. Va. May 20, 2011) (mem. op.) (discussing the extraterritoriality of the Robinson 
Patman Act, an anti-price discrimination statute). 
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B. Surfing the Waves – The Lanham Act 
The extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act, which covers trademark 
infringement and unfair competition claims, was reinforced by Morrison.147 It may 
be instructive in predicting the extraterritoriality of other federal laws after 
Morrison to understand the background supporting this finding of 
extraterritoriality. Furthermore, it is worth noting the tests that the federal appellate 
courts have developed limiting extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act. 
In 1952, the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction existed in a Lanham Act 
case where the alleged trademark infringement was consummated outside the 
United States.148 In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.,149 Bulova Watch Co. (Bulova), a 
New York corporation, sued Steele, a U.S. citizen, for stamping the name 
“Bulova” on watches that he assembled and sold in Mexico. The Court stated that 
international law did not prevent the United States from “governing the conduct of 
its own citizens . . . in foreign countries when the rights of other nations or their 
nationals are not infringed.”150 Based on the Lanham Act’s “broad jurisdictional 
                                                          
147 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2887 n.11. 
148 Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 281, 285 (1952). In deciding that jurisdiction 
existed, the Court did not find it necessary to pass on the merits of the claim. Id. at 283. 
149 344 U.S. 280 (1952). 
150 Id. at 285. 
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grant,” which included “sweeping reach into ‘all commerce which may lawfully be 
regulated by Congress,’” the Court found legislative intent that the statute’s scope 
encompassed Steele’s activities abroad.151 The Court explained that Steele’s 
“operations and effects were not confined within the territorial limits of a foreign 
nation” – Steele bought some of the watch parts in the United States, and some of 
the watches made their way into the United States.152 Furthermore, the Court noted 
that affording Bulova relief would not impugn foreign law, as Mexico’s courts had 
nullified Steele’s trademark registration of “Bulova” in Mexico.153 Significantly, in 
Morrison, the Supreme Court cited Steele for the proposition that the Lanham Act 
applies extraterritorially.154 
                                                          
151 Id. at 286-87. The Court remarked, “[T]he United States is not debarred by any rule of 
international law from governing the conduct of is own citizens upon the high seas or even in 
foreign countries when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed. With 
respect to such an exercise of authority there is no question of international law, but solely of the 
purport of the municipal law which establishes the duty of the citizen in relation to his own 
government.” Id. at 285 (citing Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941)). 
152 Id. at 286. 
153 Id. at 289. 
154 Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2887 n.11 (2010) (rejecting the 
reading that Steele merely applied a nonextraterritorial statute based on U.S. conduct). 
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Lower courts subsequently created tests to determine when extraterritorial 
application was proper under the Lanham Act.155 As in Morrison, settling the 
inquiry into extraterritoriality was not enough. Based on the Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Steele, the Second Circuit adopted a three-factor test that asks: (1) 
whether the subject defendant is a U.S. citizen; (2) whether such defendant’s 
conduct has a substantial effect on U.S. commerce; and (3) whether relief would 
create a conflict with foreign law.156  
                                                          
155 See, e.g., McBee v. Delica Co., Ltd., 417 F.3d 107, 118-19 (1st Cir. 2005); Reebok Intern., 
Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1992); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. 
Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956). 
156 Vanity Fair Mills, Inc., 234 F.2 at 642. In Steele, the Supreme Court noted that the effects of 
Steele’s conduct reached the United States but never described the effects as “substantial.” See 
Steele, 344 U.S. at 285-87. That language appears to have been derived from the Fifth Circuit’s 
opinion in the case. See id. (citing Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1952)). 
The Fifth Circuit quoted commentary accompanying the Lanham Act that stated that the statute 
covers trademark uses in foreign, territorial, or interstate commerce, as well as uses in intrastate 
commerce that have a “substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.” Bulova Watch Co. 
v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567, 570 (5th Cir. 1952) (citing Daphne Robert, Commentary on the Lanham 
Act, 268-69 (1948)).  
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While the Fourth,157 Fifth,158 and Eleventh159 Circuits have adopted the 
Second Circuit test with some variation, the First Circuit adheres to a standard 
based on the Supreme Court’s test for extraterritorial application under the antitrust 
laws. 160 That court explained that both antitrust and trademark law carry the risk 
that, absent some extraterritorial enforcement, violators who have harmed U.S. 
commerce may evade legal authority altogether.161 The First Circuit test requires a 
lesser showing of effects when the defendant is a U.S. citizen162 and disregards the 
                                                          
157 See Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., Ltd., 34 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(requiring significant, rather than substantial, effects). 
158 See Am. Rice, Inc. v. Producers Rice Mill, Inc., 518 F.3d 321, 327 (5th Cir. 2008); see also 
id. at 328 n.9 (suggesting that “some” effects might be sufficient). 
159 See Int’l Café, S.A.L. v. Hard Rock Café Intern. (U.S.A.), Inc., 252 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th 
Cir. 2001). 
160 McBee, 417 F.3d at 119-20 (allowing the test in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 590 U.S. 
764 (1993), to guide its analysis of the proper extraterritorial reach under the Lanham Act). 
161 Id. at 119.  
162 Id. at 118 (commenting that when the defendant is a U.S. citizen, “the domestic effect of the 
international activities may be of lesser importance and a lesser showing of domestic effects may 
be all that is needed”). Cf. id. at 120 (“We hold that the Lanham Act grants subject matter 
jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct by foreign defendants only where the conduct has a 
substantial effect on United States commerce.”) (emphasis added). 
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conflict-of-law inquiry.163 The Ninth Circuit similarly created a test based on 
antitrust law,164 which it recently applied in Love v. Associated Newspapers, 
Ltd.,165 making it the first federal appellate court to consider extraterritorial 
application of the Lanham Act since Morrison. 
In Love, Mike Love, a band member of The Beach Boys,166 claimed that the 
marketing and distribution of a CD in the United Kingdom and Ireland infringed 
on his limited exclusive right to use The Beach Boys trademark in live 
performances.167 After acknowledging the requirement in Morrison for a “clear 
indication of an extraterritorial application,”168 the Ninth Circuit distinguished the 
Lanham Act’s “sweeping language . . . expressly covering all commerce Congress 
can regulate” from the Exchange Act’s mere mention of “foreign commerce.”169 
The court found it unnecessary to reevaluate its case law concerning the Lanham 
                                                          
163 Id. at 120. The court states that comity considerations should be analyzed as a prudential, 
rather than extraterritorial, question. Id. at 121. 
164 Reebok Intern., Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1992). 
165 611 F.3d 601 (9th Cir. 2010). 
166 The Beach Boys: The Complete Guide, www.beachboys.com (last visited Feb. 16, 2012). 
167 Love v. Assoc. Newpapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601, 612 (9th Cir. 2010). In a bit of humor, the 
court quipped, “Love wishes they could all be California torts.” Id. at 608. 
168 Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010). 
169 See Love, 611 F.3d at 613 n.6. 
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Act’s coverage of foreign activities.170 Accordingly, the court turned to its three-
factor test for proper extraterritorial application under that Act, which provides:  
(1) [T]he alleged violations must create some effect on American 
foreign commerce;  
(2) [T]he effect must be sufficiently great to present a cognizable 
injury to the plaintiffs under the Lanham Act; and  
(3) [T]he interests of and links to American foreign commerce must 
be sufficiently strong in relation to those of other nations to justify 
assertion of extraterritorial authority.171 
Applying the test, the court found that “all relevant acts occurred abroad”172 and 
that Love failed to provide evidence of monetary injury in the United States caused 
by such acts.173 The CD was conceived and manufactured overseas and was never 
sold or distributed in the United States.174 Therefore, though the Lanham Act was 
                                                          
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 612-13. The Court noted that the test originated was originally developed for antitrust 
law. Id. at 613. 
172 Id. at 613. 
173 Id. (refusing to find that Love’s ticket sales in the United States suffered due to the CD since 




deemed to have extraterritorial application, the claims in Love were dismissed 
based on the Ninth Circuit’s test limiting the extent of that application.175  
 A number of observations can be made concerning the courts’ treatment of 
the Lanham Act’s extraterritorial application. The Love decision offers a glimpse 
of a statute that has been deemed to have extraterritorial application in large part 
due to its definition of “commerce.”176 When the petitioners in Morrison 
contended that Section 10(b) applied abroad because “interstate commerce” was 
defined to encompass “trade, commerce, transportation, or communication . . . 
between any foreign country and any state,” the Court responded that it has 
repeatedly held that statutes with broad language defining “commerce” do not have 
extraterritorial application, even in instances where “foreign commerce” was 
expressly included in the definition.177 Yet, the Lanham Act has been deemed to 
                                                          
175 Id. 
176 See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 252-53 (1991) (statutorily overruled by 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 109, 105 Stat. 1077, on other grounds). 
177 Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2882 (2010) (quoting 15 U.S.C. 
§78c(a)(17)). For examples of statutes with broad language defining “commerce” not found to 
have extraterritorial application, see EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 252-53 
(1991) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) (superseded by statute); McCulloch v. 
Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 19 (1963) (National Labor 
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have extraterritorial application based on its invocation of the Commerce Clause of 
the Constitution.178 It is not readily apparent what areas of foreign commerce are 
covered under the Commerce Clause that would not also be covered by the 
Exchange Act’s definition of “commerce,” or any other statute’s similarly-worded 
definition of “commerce.”179 Nonetheless, when considered together, Morrison and 
the extraterritorial findings of the Lanham Act suggest that a clear indication of 
extraterritorial application will not be found based on a statute’s definition of 
“commerce” unless the statute expressly calls upon the full extent of Congress’ 
power over commerce. 
Additionally, the transactional test created in Morrison and the tests created 
by the federal circuit courts to determine the scope of the Lanham Act’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Relations Act); and New York Cent. R. Co. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 31 (1925) (Federal 
Employers’ Liability Act). 
178 See Love, 611 F.3d at 613 n.6. 
179 Compare, e.g., U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, § 8 , Cl. 3 (“Congress shall have the power . . . [t]o 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian 
tribes.”), with 15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(17) (“The term ‘interstate commerce’ means trade, commerce, 
transportation, or communication among the several States, or between any foreign country and 
any State, or between any State and any place or ship outside thereof. The term also includes 
intrastate use of: (A) any facility of a national securities exchange or of a telephone or other 
interstate means of communication, or (B) any other interstate instrumentality.”). 
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extraterritorial application indicate that proper application of a particular statute 
requires a more in-depth analysis than an inquiry into the statute’s extraterritorial 
application.180 Morrison sets the stage for a two-step analysis asking: (1) Does the 
subject statute contain a clear indication of extraterritorial application?  And (2) 
what is the proper scope of its domestic (or extraterritorial) application?181 The 
second question, from which the Morrison transactional test182 and the tests 
developed by the federal circuit courts for the Lanham Act183 emerged, really gets 
to the heart of the matter – proper application of the statute. 
Stating that a statute has extraterritorial application when, in reality, that 
application is limited by considerations of U.S. connections may not be 
                                                          
180 With regard to the Lanham Act though, practitioners should keep in mind that the Supreme 
Court has yet to hear a case involving the proper scope of extraterritorial application under the 
Act and therefore has not endorsed any of the federal appellate court tests. 
181 A recent case on the extraterritoriality of RICO actually broke its discussion into two parts 
entitled: (1) “Whether RICO Applies Extraterritorially” and (2) “Whether [Defendant] Seeks 
Extraterritorial Application.” See Sorota v. Sosa, No. 11-80897-CV, 2012 WL 313530, at *2, *4 
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2012).  
182 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884-86 (inquiring into the proper domestic application of Section 
10(b)). 
183 Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1956) (laying out the test 
for proper extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act). 
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significantly different than stating a statute does not have extraterritorial 
application when, in reality, so-called domestic application of the statute allows for 
foreign contacts so long as certain U.S. requirements are met.184 In both instances, 
it is the specific degree and type of U.S. contacts necessary to state a claim that 
really matter.185 Thus, the essential question is what are the minimum U.S. 
contacts, if any, necessary to state a claim under the applicable statute.  The 
presumption against extraterritoriality would then only be applied once – in the 
court’s statutory analysis when answering this question.186 
                                                          
184 For instance, despite stating that the Lanham Act has extraterritorial reach, the Second Circuit 
looks for U.S. citizenship and effect on U.S. commerce when considering claims under the Act. 
Vanity Fair Mills, Inc., 234 F.2d at 642. Additionally, the Morrison transactional test allows a 
claim under Section 10(b), a statute without extraterritorial reach, so long as the securities 
purchase or sale occurs on a domestic exchange or otherwise is a domestic transaction. Morrison, 
130 S. Ct. at 2886.  
185 This is especially true in a time of globalization where an increasing number of cases involve 
both U.S. and foreign contacts.   For a different perspective on extraterritorial application, see 
United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F. 3d 1095, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2009), which defined 
“true” extraterritorial reach as “foreign conduct that has no conduct on the United States.”    
186 Compare Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877-78, 2884 (applying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality when determining the extraterritorial reach of Section 10(b) and again when 
determining the domestic activity needed to state a Section 10(b) claim). In response to the 
plaintiff’s argument for domestic application of Section 10(b) in Morrison, Justice Scalia stated 
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Though the analysis in Morrison likely ensures that courts will first look to 
see if a statute has a clear indication of extraterritorial application, the more 
important battleground seems to be the second set of tests outlining proper 
application of a statute where both U.S. and foreign contacts are involved. Indeed, 
concurring in the judgment in Morrison, Justice Stevens commented, “[t]he real 
motor of the Court’s opinion, it seems, is not the presumption against 
extraterritoriality but rather the Court’s belief that transactions on domestic 
exchanges are ‘the focus of the Exchange Act’ and ‘the objects of [its] 
solicitude.”187  
Overall, even though the presumption against extraterritoriality is not a new 
canon of statutory construction, Morrison has created a more difficult environment 
for plaintiffs to bring claims involving U.S. and foreign contacts. Defendants will 
bring more Rule 12(b)(6) challenges regarding extraterritorial application, 
asserting that either the statute at issue does not have extraterritorial reach or that 
the U.S. contacts are insufficient to state a claim. Indeed, in light of Morrison, use 
of the conduct and effects test in other areas of law that are not “textually 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that the “presumption here (as often) is not self-evidently dispositive, but its application requires 
further analysis.” Id. at 2884. 
187 Id. at 2894 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
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plausible”188 are susceptible to being overruled.189 The future will likely be shaped 
by courts focusing on the language and objectives of a statute and developing tests 
therefrom.190 An absence of statutory direction regarding conflicts with foreign  
                                                          
188 Id. at 2884 n.9. 
189 It should be noted, however, that in determining if a clear indication of extraterritorial 
application exists, Morrison still allows courts to consult statutory context in deriving “the most 
faithful reading of the text.” Id. at 2883 (stating that a clear statement such as “this law applies 
abroad” is not necessary for a statutory finding of extraterritorial reach). For instance, in a post-
Morrison decision, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated that a clear expression of 
congressional intent that a statute apply abroad was needed to overcome the presumption against 
extraterritoriality and that “[s]uch an intention may appear on the face of the statute, but it may 
also be ‘inferred from . . . the nature of the harm the statute is designed to prevent,’ from the self-
evident ‘international focus of the statute,’ and from the fact that ‘limit[ing] [the statute’s] 
prohibitions to acts occurring within the United States would undermine the statute’s 
effectiveness.’” United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 811 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal citations 
omitted) (considering whether the Torture Act had extraterritorial application). 
190 One commentator concluded that Morrison “giv[es] courts total discretion to discern the 
‘focus’ of any given statute.” Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 
97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1044-45 (2011). As evidenced in Morrison, there is room to debate the 
focus of the congressional concern of a statute. Compare Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 
(concluding that domestic exchanges and domestic transactions were the primary concern of 
Congress, with id. at 2894 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing, rather, that “public 
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laws will weigh in favor of a more limiting test.191 
In addition to these broader statutory inquiries, Morrison generated specific 
concerns under the Exchange Act with respect to the effect of its new transactional 
test on Section 10(b) actions. The next section discusses the two prongs of the 
Morrison transactional test in detail, as well as the test’s possible expansion in 
light of the recently completed Dodd-Frank study on Section 10(b) private rights of 
action. 
V. The New Wave – Section 10(b) Transactional Test 
After deciding in Morrison that Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act did not 
have extraterritorial application,192 the Supreme Court created a test to determine 
proper domestic application under the Act where foreign contacts are involved.193 
The Morrison transactional test requires either: (1) a purchase or sale of a security 
listed on a domestic exchange; or (2) a purchase or sale of a security made in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
interest” and the “interests of investors” were the focus of the Exchange Act). See also Sorota v. 
Sosa, No. 11-80897-CV, 2012 WL 313530, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2012) (focus of RICO is 
“enterprise”) and CGC Holding Co., LLC v. Hutchens, No. 11-CV-01012-RBJ-KLM, 2011 WL 
5320988, at *14 (D. Colo. Nov. 1, 2011) (focus of RICO is “racketeering activity”). 
191 See id. at 2885. 
192 Id. at 2883. 
193 Id. at 2886 (referring to the adopted test as the “transactional test”). 
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United States.194 While federal courts have already had occasion to interpret the 
Morrison transactional test in a variety of settings,195 there are critical questions 
that remain unresolved. The analysis below begins with an examination of the first 
prong of the Morrison transactional test. 
A. The First Wave – Purchase or Sale of a Security Listed on a U.S. 
Exchange 
Under the first prong of the Morrison transactional test, a purchase or sale of 
a security listed on a domestic exchange is subject to Section 10(b).196 The inquiry 
under this prong focuses on the circumstances in which the listing requirement is 
                                                          
194 Id. 
195 See, e.g., Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 645 F.3d 
1307, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2011) (over-the-counter purchase agreement designating the United 
States as the place of closing); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Secs. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 
530-31 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (stock purchase on a foreign exchange); Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 
Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 166, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (stock 
purchase by a U.S. resident); Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Automobil Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 
469, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (over-the-counter swap agreements). 
196 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886. 
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met.197 In this respect, there are two ways that foreign companies seek to access 
capital markets through U.S. exchanges. First, ordinary shares, which are the 
foreign equivalent of common stock, may be listed on U.S. exchanges to trade as a 
U.S. company’s stock normally would.198 Second, ordinary shares of a foreign 
issuer may be represented on U.S. exchanges through American Depositary 
Receipts (ADRs),199 which are securities that indicate ownership of ordinary shares 
but avoid the currency complications of foreign investments.200  
                                                          
197 See generally Daniel Hemel, Comment, Issuer Choice After Morrison, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 
471 (2011) (examining the courts’ early interpretations of the first prong of the transactional 
test). 
198 For a listing of foreign companies with stock trading directly on NYSE, go to: NYSE Listings 
Directory, NYSE, http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/lc_ny_overview.html (go to “Issue Type” 
tab, select “Common Stock” from the Issue Type dropdown, and click on “NYSE-Listed Non-
U.S. Companies”).  
For a listing of foreign companies with stock trading directly on NASDAQ, go to: 
NASDAQ INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES, http://www.nasdaq.com/asp/nonUSoutput.asp (click on 
“Download non U.S. company list” and then filter for non-ADR issuers).  See sources cited 
supra note 28. 
199 For a listing of foreign companies with stock trading through ADRs on the NYSE, go to: 
NYSE Listings Directory, NYSE, http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/lc_ny_overview.html (go to 
“Issue Type” tab, select “ADS Common” from the Issue Type dropdown, and click on “NYSE-
Listed Non-U.S. Companies”).  
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After Morrison, plaintiffs have argued that so long as a company’s shares 
are listed or represented on a U.S. exchange, a purchase or sale of stock on a 
foreign exchange satisfies the first prong of the transactional test.201 Courts have 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
For a listing of foreign companies with stock trading through ADRs on NASDAQ, go to: 
NASDAQ INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES, http://www.nasdaq.com/asp/nonUSoutput.asp (click on 
“Download non U.S. company list” and then filter for ADR issuers). 
200 See Velli, supra note 28, at S39. SEC requirements differ for each type of ADR, which 
include: Level I – unsponsored or sponsored, limited to over-the-counter trading; Level II – 
sponsored by the issuing company, listed on U.S. exchange; Level III – sponsored by the issuing 
company, listed on U.S. exchange, can conduct a public offering; Rule 144A – sponsored, 
limited to private placement with qualified institutional buyers. DR Basics and Benefits, BNY 
MELLON DEPOSITARY RECEIPTS, 
http://www.adrbnymellon.com/dr_edu_basics_and_benefits.jsp#l1dr (last visited Feb. 16, 2012). 
For an in-depth discussion of ADRs and Morrison, see Vincent M. Chiappini, How American 
Are American Depositary Receipts? ADRs, Rule 10b-5 Suits, and Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1795 (2011). 
201 See, e.g., In re Royal Bank of Scotland PLC Secs. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 335-36 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (ordinary shares represented by ADRs on NYSE); In re Alstom SA Secs. Litig., 
741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 471-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (same); Sglambo v. McKenzie, 739 F. Supp. 2d 
453, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (ordinary shares directly listed on NYSE). 
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consistently rejected this argument, explaining that such an outcome would 
undermine Morrison’s focus on domestic exchanges.202  
For instance, in In re Alstom SA, Securities Litigation,203 class members had 
their Section 10(b) action dismissed where their purchases of a French company’s 
shares occurred on a foreign stock exchange, despite the fact that the company’s 
ADRs traded on the NYSE.204 The court explained that Morrison was “concerned 
                                                          
202 See, e.g., In re UBS Secs. Litig., No. 07 Civ. 11225(RJS), 2011 WL 4059356, at *4-7 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2011); In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Secs. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 530-
31 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Royal Bank of Scotland PLC, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 336; In re Alstom SA, 
741 F. Supp. 2d at 472-73.  Note, however, that in this situation, plaintiffs may be able to 
institute suit under Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.  15 U.S.C. § 78r(a).  Section 
18(a) allows for a private right of action based on a materially false or misleading statement 
contained in any document filed with the SEC under the Exchange Act.  The statute has strict 
reliance and loss causation requirements.  Nonetheless, the statute should prove useful for 
investors who purchase (or sell) securities on a foreign exchange of a company whose shares 
also are listed on a U.S. stock exchange.  Such issuers must file Exchange Act reports with the 
SEC.  See Marc I. Steinberg, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 300-01 (5th ed. 2009); Roger W. 
Kirby, Access to United States Courts By Purchasers of Foreign Listed Securities in the 
Aftermath of  Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd., 7 HAST. BUS. L.J. 223, 262-63 (2011). 
203 741 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
204 In re Alstom SA, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 471-72 (concerning ordinary shares purchased on the 
Euronext Paris Exchange). 
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with the territorial location where the purchase or sale was executed and the 
securities exchange laws that governed the transaction.”205 Similarly, in Sglambo v. 
McKenzie,206 where a Canadian company’s shares traded both on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange (TSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), the court 
summarily dismissed class members who had only purchased or sold common 
stock on the TSE.207 Overall, in determining whether a purchase or sale involves a 
security listed on a U.S. exchange, the lower courts uniformly have based their 
holdings on the territorial location of the exchange where the transaction at issue 
occurred. 
                                                          
205 In re Alstom SA, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 472-73 (quoting Morrison v. National Australia Bank 
Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010)). See also In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Secs. Litig., 765 F. 
Supp. 2d at 527-34 (dismissing claims based on trades of a French company’s ordinary shares on 
the Paris Bourse exchange though shares were listed for non-trading purposes in support of 
ADRs on the NYSE). 
206 739 F. Supp. 2d 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
207 Sglambo v. McKenzie, 739 F. Supp. 2d 453, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). See also In re Celestica 
Inc. Secs. Litig., No. 07 CV 312(GBD), 2010 WL 4159587, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2010) 
(not reported) (disallowing purported class members who purchased Canadian defendant’s 
common stock on the TSE, though it also traded directly on the NYSE) rev’d on other grounds, 
New Orleans Employees Ret. Sys. v. Celestica, Inc., No. 10-4702-cv, 2011 WL 6823204 (2d Cir. 
Dec. 29, 2011). 
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This territorial application is consistent with the directives expressed in 
Morrison, focusing on “purchases and sales of securities in the United States.”208 
Indeed, if the transactional test could be met so long as stock that was purchased or 
sold on a foreign exchange had an identical or similar security listed on a U.S. 
exchange, one would have expected Morrison’s outcome to be different since 
National Australia had ADRs listed on the NYSE.209  
Consistent with Morrison, courts have allowed purchases or sales of ADRs 
made on a U.S. exchange to proceed.210  This is not to say all ADR purchases 
necessarily are within Section 10(b)’s scope. There has been some disagreement as 
to whether a purchase or sale of an ADR that trades over-the-counter satisfies the 
                                                          
208 Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010) (emphasis added) (“We 
know of no one who thought that the Act was intended to “regulat[e]’ foreign securities 
exchanges . . . .”). 
209 Id. at 2875-76. 
210 See, e.g., In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Secs. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d at 530-31 (allowing the 
Section 10(b) claim of both U.S. and foreign class members who purchased ADRs listed and 
traded on the NYSE to proceed); Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co., Nos. CV 10-0922 DSF 
(AJWx), 2010 WL 3377409, at *1, *3 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010) (mem. op.) (analyzing Morrison 
and then appointing a pension fund as the lead plaintiff because the fund, which had purchased 
ADRs, suffered the largest loss). 
64 
 
Morrison transactional test. 211 The next section, which discusses purchase or sales 
in the United States that do not occur on U.S. exchanges, will examine this 
situation further.  
Overall, the listing of foreign stock directly, or the representation of foreign 
stock through ADRs, on a U.S. exchange alone is not enough to warrant Section 
10(b) coverage under the Morrison transactional test. To satisfy the listing 
requirement of the first prong of the test, courts have required that the transaction 
at issue take place on a U.S. exchange. Purchases of ADRs on a domestic 
exchange come within Section 10(b) coverage.  On the other hand, U.S. investors 
who purchase or sell securities outside of this country, whether on a stock 
exchange, over-the-counter, or in private transactions, are left without a Section 
10(b) claim unless they can show that, pursuant to the second prong of the 
transactional test, the purchase or sale was made in the United States. The next 
section explores the scope of transactions covered by the second prong. 
B. A More Tumultuous Wave – Purchase or Sale of Any Other 
Security in the United States 
                                                          
211 See, e.g., In re Societe Generale Secs. Litig., No. 08 Civ 2495(RMB), 2010 WL 3910286, at 
*6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010) (not reported) (noting in support of a Section 10(b) dismissal that 
the ADRs of a French company were not traded on a U.S. exchange). 
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The second prong of the Morrison transactional test raises a host of 
questions. In addressing this prong, the Supreme Court referenced to “purchases or 
sales made in the United States” as well as “domestic transactions.”212 
Unfortunately, this terminology fails to provide sufficient light on the type of 
transactions that qualify under the second prong. Perhaps due to this lack of 
guidance, there is already a wealth of case law interpreting this terminology.213 
Many attempts by plaintiffs to satisfy the second prong of the Morrison 
transactional test have failed.214 One of the arguments not surprisingly rejected by 
the courts is that a purchase of stock on a foreign exchange is a domestic 
                                                          
212 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884, 2885-86. 
213 See, e.g., Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 645 F.3d 
1307, 1310-11 (11th Cir. 2011); Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss 
Reinsurance Co., 753 F. Supp. 2d 166, 178-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich 
Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 372, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Stackhouse, 2010 WL 3377409, at *1. 
214 See, e.g., Cascade Fund, LLP v. Absolute Capital Mgmt Holdings Ltd., No. 08-cv-01381-
MSK-CBS, 2011 WL 1211511, slip op. at *14 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011); In re Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group PLC Secs. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Elliott Assocs. v. 
Porsche Automobil Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 474-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Societe 
Generale Secs. Litig., 2010 WL 3910286, at *6; Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund, 




transaction because the purchase was made by a U.S. resident.215 Clearly, nothing 
in Morrison indicates that for Section 10(b) purposes the location of a transaction 
turns on a purchaser’s residency or citizenship.216  As one court observed, “[a] 
foreign resident can make a purchase within the United States, and a United States 
resident can make a purchase outside the United States,” but Section 10(b) only 
reaches the former.217 Indeed, ascertaining the reach of Section 10(b) based on the 
U.S. residency (or citizenship) of the complainant would inappropriately revive a 
primary component of the abandoned “effects” test.218  As a consequence, under 
Morrison’s transactional test, Section 10(b) does “not extend to foreign securities 
trades executed on foreign exchanges even if purchased or sold by American 
investors.”219  
                                                          
215 See, e.g., In re BP P.L.C. Secs. Litig., No. 4:10-MD-2185, 2012 WL 432611, at *16 (S.D. 
Tex. Feb. 13, 2011); In re UBS Secs. Litig., No. 07 Civ. 11225(RJS), 2011 WL 4059356, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2011); Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 178; 
Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 624. 
216 Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 178. 
217 Id. 
218 Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 624 (involving stock purchased on foreign exchange by a U.S. 
pension fund). 




Place of injury has also been rejected as a basis for Section 10(b) coverage 
under Morrison.220 One court commented, “there is no textual or logical basis [in 
the Exchange Act] for making injury a sufficient condition for the statute's 
application without the existence of a domestic purchase or sale.”221 After 
Morrison, therefore, a U.S. investor injured in the United States from a purchase or 
sale transacted abroad is without recourse under Section 10(b).  
Next, consistent with Morrison’s rejection of the conduct test, courts have 
deemed the place of deceptive conduct irrelevant to the transactional test.222 For 
                                                          
220 In re UBS Secs. Litig., 2011 WL 4059356, at *8; Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension 
Fund, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 178. 
221 Id. 
222 See, e.g., Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 
533, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that the Complaint includes “numerous instances of U.S.-
based conduct” but fails to allege that a purchase or sale occurred in the United States); SEC v. 
Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The shortcoming of all this 
U.S.-based conduct is precisely that—it is just conduct.”); Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 
Pension Fund, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 179. In Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, the court discussed 
how, in Morrison, the Supreme Court:  discarded the conduct and effects tests, which valued 
whether the harmed investor was American or foreign; did not place importance on the place 
where the deceptive conduct began; and referred to E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 
U.S. 244 (1991), a case where extraterritorial application was rejected despite some domestic 
contacts. Id. at 626 (referring to Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879, 2884-85). 
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example, in SEC v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,223 the SEC referenced Goldman 
Sachs’ actions in this country in an attempt to state Section 10(b) claims that 
involved purchases of notes by a German bank and sales of credit default swaps by 
a Netherland bank. The alleged deceptive conduct included transmission of false 
and misleading marketing materials and emails. The court dismissed the claims, 
explaining that domestic conduct is no longer the test for Section 10(b) liability.224 
As Morrison reasons, “Section 10(b) does not punish deceptive conduct, but only 
transactions that take place in the United States that involve deceptive conduct 
committed ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange or any security not so registered.”225 
Likewise, assertions that a transaction ought to be considered a domestic 
transaction where the decision to invest was made in the United States have proven 
futile.226 Concluding that an investment decision in the United States to purchase 
                                                          
223 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
224 Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d at 158-61. 
225 Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2884 (2010).  Of course, Section 10(b) also 
prohibits “manipulative” conduct.  See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Marc 
I. Steinberg, SECURITIES REGULATION  414-25 (rev. 5th ed. 2009). 
226 See, e.g., Cascade Fund, LLP v. Absolute Capital Mgmt Holdings Ltd., No. 08-cv-01381-
MSK-CBS, 2011 WL 1211511, slip op. at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011); In re Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group PLC Secs. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 327, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (U.S. pension and 
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stock has “no bearing on where the stock was ultimately purchased,”227 courts have 
rejected this argument.228 One court reasoned that allowing claims just because 
“some acts that ultimately resulted in execution of the transaction abroad [took] 
place in the United States” would only serve to revive the rejected conduct test.229  
Several plaintiffs have advocated a seemingly more persuasive position that 
also has met with failure thus far, contending that purchase orders placed in the 
United States for stock listed on a foreign exchange are domestic transactions 
under Morrison.230 As one court reasoned, “the Exchange Act was not intended to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
retirement funds bought British stock on British and Amsterdam exchanges); Plumbers’ Union 
Local No. 12 Pension Fund, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 178. In In re Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC 
Securities Litigation, plaintiffs additionally noted that the decision was based on the advice of 
U.S.-based asset managers. 765 F. Supp. 2d at 336. 
227 Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 178 (citing plaintiff’s 
rejected argument for Section 10(b) coverage in Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, 729 F. Supp. 
2d 620, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
228 See, e.g., id. at 178; Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 622, 627. 
229 Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 624. 
230 See, e.g., Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 178; Stackhouse v. 
Toyota Motor Co., Nos. CV 10-0922 DSF (AJWx), etal. , 2010 WL 3377409, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 
July 16, 2010) (mem. op.). In In re BP P.L.C. Securities Litigation, plaintiffs unsuccessfully tried 
to rely on the trading rules of the LSE to establish a domestic transaction. No. 4:10-MD-2185, 
2012 WL 432611, at *68-69 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2011). They explained that LSE’s electronic 
70 
 
regulate foreign exchanges” and that, due to the potential for conflicts with foreign 
law, “United States securities laws should defer to the law of the country where the 
security is exchanged.”231 Based on Morrison’s rationale, therefore, it may well be 
that transactions effected on foreign exchanges can never be domestic transactions 
coming within Section 10(b) coverage. 
After having gone through the rejected bases for defining a domestic 
transaction – that is, residency or citizenship, location where injury occurred, 
location of deceptive conduct, location of investment decision, and location where 
the purchase orders were placed – it is time to examine a basis that has yielded 
inconsistent responses from the courts. The theory that domestic transactions under 
the second prong of Morrison referred to “purchases and sales of securities 
explicitly solicited by the issuer within the United States” was first suggested and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
trading network could pair a third-party market maker in the United States with a U.S. investor 
and argued that this type of transaction takes place in the United States, not in London. Id. at 
*68. The court replied, “carving out an exception for the purchase of securities on the LSE 
because some acts that ultimately result in the execution of a transaction abroad take place in the 
United States would be to reinstate the conduct test.” Id. at *69. 
231 Stackhouse, 2010 WL 3377409, at *1.  See Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund, 753 
F. Supp. 2d at 179 (rejecting a Section 10(b) claim where a U.S. pension fund placed a purchase 
order in the United States for Swiss stock on a Swiss exchange) 
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adopted in Stackhouse v. Toyota Motor Co.,232 a memorandum opinion designating 
a lead plaintiff for a securities class action suit.233 A decision from the Southern 
District of New York subsequently accepted this interpretation of the Morrison 
transaction test,234 but that district has declined to consistently follow it.235  To add 
to this division, the District Court for the District of Colorado found Stackhouse’s 
interpretation unpersuasive.236 In Cascade Fund, LLP v. Absolute Capital 
Management Holdings, Ltd.,237 the court pointed out that Morrison did not 
attribute any significance to the place of solicitation in reaching its holding.238  
Indeed, it is questionable whether any part of the transactional test relies on 
                                                          
232 Nos. CV 10-0922 DSF (AJWx), et al. , 2010 WL 3377409, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010) 
(mem. op.) (emphasis added). 
233 Stackhouse, 2010 WL 3377409, at *1. 
234 See  Elliott Assocs. v. Porche Automobil Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010). 
235 Compare Elliott Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 476 (quoting Stackhouse), with SEC v. Goldman 
Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 158-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (failing to key in on the alleged 
solicitation by Goldman Sachs and instead dismissing two Section 10(b) claims because the SEC 
failed to allege that “any party incurred ‘irrevocable liability’ in the United States”). 
236 Cascade Fund, LLP v. Absolute Capital Mgmt Holdings Ltd., No. 08-cv-01381-MSK-CBS, 
2011 WL 1211511, slip op. at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011) (finding Stackhouse unpersuasive). 
237 No. 08-cv-01381-MSK-CBS, 2011 WL 1211511 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011). 
238 Cascade Fund, LLP, 2011 WL 1211511, slip op. at *6. 
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solicitation, as this would rekindle aspects of the conduct test that the Supreme 
Court expressly overruled.239  
More recently, the District Court for the Southern District of New York has 
focused on the notion of “irrevocable liability” rather than solicitation when 
considering domestic transactions under Morrison.240 This treatment stems from an 
analysis of case law and the statutory language of the Exchange Act performed by 
the court in Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance 
Co.241  There, the court determined that a purchase under the Exchange Act occurs 
when the parties incurred “irrevocable liability” to consummate the transaction.242  
                                                          
239 See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2887 (2010) (overruling Leasco 
Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (1972), the case involving 
fraudulent inducement from which the conduct test arose). See also id. at 2885 (“[W]e reject the 
notion that the Exchange Act reaches conduct in this country affecting exchanges or transactions 
abroad . . . .”). 
240 See, e.g., Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 
533, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. at 157-58. 
241 753 F. Supp. 2d 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
242 Id.at 177. 
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In April 2012, the Second Circuit adopted a similar test for domestic 
transactions under Morrison.243 The court stated in Absolute Activist Value Master 
Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto244 that a domestic transaction requires irrevocable liability to 
be incurred or title to be transferred within the United States.245 In discussing 
irrevocable liability, the court noted that the definitions of the terms “purchase” 
and “sale” in the Exchange Act include any contract for such undertaking.246 The 
court explained that the point at which parties contractually obligate themselves to 
                                                          
243 See Absolute Activist  Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(Discussion, Part C). 
244 677 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2012). 
245 Id. 
246 Id. (discussing 15 U.S.C § 78c (13)-(14) (2011)). When construing the terms “purchase” and 
“sale” under the Exchange Act, courts have asked when the subject party became irrevocably 
bound” to buy or sell the securities such that “his rights and obligations became fixed.” Portney 
v. Revlon, Inc., 650 F.2d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 1981). See also DiLorenzo v. Murphy, 443 F.3d 224, 
229 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that a purchase occurs under the Exchange Act once the purchaser 
“fully and irrevocably pa[ys]” for the securities); Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 
1954) (explaining that a person is a purchaser under the Exchange Act when he “incur[s] an 
irrevocable liability to take and pay for stock”). 
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take and pay for a security or deliver a security can be used to determine the locus 
of that securities transaction.247 
The facts needed to satisfy the irrevocable liability analysis for domestic 
transactions under Morrison are unresolved, as the post-Morrison cases using the 
analysis have either been dismissed for failure to allege sufficient facts248 or 
granted leave to amend the complaint with further facts.249 In Absolute Activist 
Value Master Fund Ltd., the court suggested that facts regarding “the formation of 
contracts, the placement of purchase orders, the passing of title, or the exchange of 
money” would help to show that the parties became irrevocably bound or that the 
title passed in the United States.250 It is also instructive to make note of one of the 
instances where the alleged facts were found lacking.  
In SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co.,251 the SEC alleged that the securities 
transaction at issue closed in New York. The court held, however, that there were 
                                                          
247 Absolute Activist  Value Master Fund Ltd., 677 F.3d at 60+. 
248 See, e.g., Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 
533, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 157-61 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Plumbers’ Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co., 753 F. 
Supp. 2d 166, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
249 See Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd., 677 F.3d at 60+. 
250 Id. 
251 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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no facts alleging that any party incurred irrevocable liability in the United States.252 
It explained that, under Morrison, “the closing, absent ‘a purchase or sale . . . made 
in the United States,’ is not determinative.”253 Thus, it appears that courts will not 
presume that parties incurred irrevocable liability at the closing, even though that 
may often be the case.254 
Other interpretations of “domestic transactions” under Morrison have 
considered the location where the subscription agreements were accepted.255 For 
instance, in Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd.,256 a case brought by foreign 
investors against Bernie Madoff’s foreign feeder funds, the plaintiffs argued that 
                                                          
252 Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d at 159-61. 
253 Id. at 158-59. 
254 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 291 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “closing” as when “the 
transaction is consummated”). 
255 See, e.g., Cascade Fund, LLP v. Absolute Capital Mgmt Holdings, Ltd., No . 08-cv-01381-
MSK-CBS, 2011 WL 1211511, slip op. at *7 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2011) (granting defendant’s 
motion to dismiss after concluding that completion of the transaction did not occur until 
defendant accepted the subscription agreement in the Cayman Islands); Anwar v. Fairfield 
Greenwich Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 372, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (mandating further discovery before 
ruling on defendant’s motion to dismiss where plaintiff’s transactions were not on foreign 
exchanges and where the subscription agreements were allegedly accepted in New York). 
256 728 F. Supp. 2d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (a Bernie-Madoff feeder fund case). 
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the second prong of the Morrison transactional test was met because, though they 
sent their subscription agreements to foreign administrators, a transaction did not 
occur until the agreements were accepted in the defendants’ New York offices.257 
With no securities purchases or sales “executed on a foreign exchange,” the court 
stated that Anwar entailed a “novel and more complex application of Morrison’s 
transactional test.”258 The court concluded that, given the unique financial interests, 
transaction structures, and party relationships involved, more facts were needed to 
determine if plaintiffs’ purchases occurred in the United States.259 
Considering the location where the subscription agreement was accepted is 
consistent with the irrevocable liability analysis. Acceptance of an agreement 
presumably forms a contract that makes the parties liable to each other if they fail 
                                                          
257 Id. at 405. 
258 Id. The court noted that the securities were “listed . . . [but] not actually traded” on a foreign 
exchange. Id. 
259 Id. For another case brought by Madoff’s feeder funds with similar results, see In re Optimal 
U.S. Litigation, No. 10 Civ. 4095(SAS), 2011 WL 1676067 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2011). In that 
case, the court denied a defendant’s motion to dismiss, stating that a more fully-developed 
factual record was needed to establish “where all of Plaintiffs’ shares were ‘issued,’ where they 
wired their subscription payments, what the statement ‘WE BOUGHT FOR YOUR ACCOUNT 
IN: NYS’ means, and where their subscription agreements were ‘accepted.’” Id. at *12. 
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to pay for or deliver the security as promised.260 Thus, under this approach, a 
plaintiff who pleads facts alleging that a private securities agreement was accepted 
in the United States may well satisfy the irrevocable liability analysis for 
demonstrating a domestic transaction under Morrison. 
Arguably, there are instances where courts have interpreted Morrison too 
broadly to exclude certain privately placed securities transactions from Section 
10(b) coverage.261  For example, in Elliott Associates v. Porsche Automobil 
Holding SE,262 the court considered whether there was a substantive distinction 
between the placement of a buy order in the United States for a security traded 
abroad, which it did not consider a “domestic transaction,” and the execution of a 
                                                          
260 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1 (“A contract is a promise or set of promises for the 
breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way 
recognizes as a duty.”). 
261 See, e.g., Elliott Assocs. v. Porsche Automobil Holding SE, 759 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2010) (dismissing a Section 10(b) claim where the swap agreement was 
executed in the United States but the underlying shares traded on a foreign exchange); In re 
Societe Generale Secs. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495(RMB), 2010 WL 3910286, slip op. at *5-7 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010) (dismissing Section 10(b) claims based on ADRs that were not traded 
on a U.S. exchange) . 
262 759 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (U.S. and foreign hedge funds, which were all managed 
from New York, sued foreign companies under the Exchange Act.). 
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swap agreement in the United States referencing foreign stock.263 Plaintiffs argued 
that, although the Volkswagon ordinary shares underlying their swap agreements 
traded on a German exchange, the agreements qualified as domestic transactions 
under Morrison since they were signed in the United States.264 The court 
determined that the economic reality was that the swap agreements were 
“essentially ‘transactions conducted upon foreign exchanges and markets,’ and not 
‘domestic transactions’ that merit[ed] the protection of [Section] 10(b).”265 
Referencing Morrison, the court relied on the presumption against 
extraterritoriality and that the Exchange Act was not intended to regulate foreign 
securities transactions.266  The court concluded that “transactions in foreign-traded 
securities – or swap agreements that reference them – where only the purchaser is 
located in the United States” are not covered by Section 10(b).267  
                                                          
263 Elliot Assocs., 759 F. Supp. 2d at 474-76. A security swap agreement is a private contract that 
fluctuates in value based on the price of the shares referenced within; it is not traded on any 
exchange. 
264 Id. at 474. 
265 Id. at 476. 
266 Id. (citing Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010)). 
267 Id.  The judge stated, “I am loathe to create a rule that would make foreign issuers with little 
relationship to the U.S. subject to suits here simply because a private party in this country 
entered into a derivatives contract that references the foreign issuer's stock. Such a holding 
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In a more expansive decision denying Section 10(b) coverage, In re Societe 
Generale Securities Litigation,268 the court held that a transaction involving over-
the-counter ADRs was not a domestic transaction under Morrison.269 The court 
reasoned that “[t]rade in ADRs is considered to be a ‘predominantly foreign 
securities transaction.’”270  For further support, the court focused on the foreign 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
would turn Morrison’s presumption against extraterritoriality on its head.” Id. One commentary 
expressed concern this approach “would likely deny all purchasers of ADRs a remedy under 
Section 10(b).” Christian J. Ward, Esq., & J. Campbell Barket, Esq., Comment, Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank: The Impact on Institutional Investors, 27 No. 17 WL J. Corp. Officers 
& Dirs. Liability 1 (2012). 
For another case that considered the economic reality of the transaction, see Valentini v. 
Citigroup, No. 11 Civ. 1355(LBS), 2011 WL 6780915, at *13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2011), 
which determined that convertible securities satisfied the second prong of the Morrison 
transactional test where the securities were notes that could, under certain circumstances, convert 
into domestically-traded stock. 
268 In re Societe Generale Secs. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495(RMB), 2010 WL 3910286 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 29, 2010). 
269 Id. at *6. 
270 Id. at *4, *6 (quoting Copeland v. Fortis, 586 F. Supp. 2d 498, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
However, In re SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG Litigation, the case that Copeland derived this 
statement from, does not actually stand for this assertion. See Copeland, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 506 
(citing In re SCOR Holding (Switzerland) AG Litig., 537 F. Supp. 2d 556, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)). 
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defendant’s ADRs that were traded “in a less formal market [than a U.S. exchange] 
with lower exposure to U.S.-resident buyers.”271  
Both Elliott Associates and In re Societe Generale unduly expand 
Morrison’s scope.  Since the second prong of the transactional test asks if “the 
purchase or sale is made in the United States,” an execution of a swap agreement 
in the United States should satisfy Morrison.272 Likewise, the focus with repect to 
over-the-counter ADRs should be on whether the ADR was purchased in the 
United States. By focusing instead on the foreign shares underlying these 
securities, the familiarity of the market where the ADRs are traded, and the number 
of U.S. resident purchasers, the court in In re Societe Generale misapplied the 
Morrison transactional test. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Prior to Morrison, the court in In re SCOR Holding merely stated, “Assuming that the purchase 
of [ADRs] on the NYSE . . . may be viewed as predominantly foreign securities transactions, it is 
not contested here that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising out of such 
transactions under the effects test without consideration of the conduct test.” 537 F. Supp. 2d at 
562. Thus, since the jurisdiction of the ADRs was uncontested, the court had no occasion to 
make a determination that the ADRs actually were predominantly foreign securities. 
271 In re Societe Generale Secs. Litig., 2010 WL 3910286, slip op. at *6.  Thus, while Section 
10(b) evidently covers purchases or sales of ADRs listed on U.S. exchanges, the statute may not 
cover ADRs traded over-the-counter. 
272 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010) (transactional test). 
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After Morrison, parties may seek by contractual agreement to bring their 
transaction within Section 10(b) coverage.  Hence, to what extent can parties use 
contractual language to satisfy Morrison’s “domestic transactions” prong?  In 
Quail Cruises Ship Management Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada,273 
for example, a foreign corporation argued that the private purchase of foreign stock 
from another foreign corporation constituted a purchase or sale in the United States 
under Morrison because the share purchase agreement contained a forum selection 
clause providing for U.S. law and designated U.S. law offices as the place of 
closing.274 The court dismissed the claim, explaining that “[a]dopting a rule that 
permits the intent of parties located abroad and contracting from their home 
countries in a wholly off-shore transaction to apply United States securities law is 
inconsistent with Morrison.”275  
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded the decision.276 The 
appellate court observed that the plaintiffs had alleged that the closing “actually 
                                                          
273 732 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
274 Id. at 1347, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
275 Id. at 1350. 
276 See generally Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 645 
F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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occurred in the United States.”277 The court then relied on the definition of 
“closing” in Black’s Law Dictionary to conclude that the transaction was 
consummated at closing.278 Lastly, the court found that the purchase agreement 
confirmed that the sale occurred at this domestic closing because the agreement 
stated that the title to the shares did not transfer until closing.279  This decision 
suggests that Section 10(b) coverage may be available for transactions where the 
parties bought or sold securities in accordance with contractual language 
mandating that the closing occur in the United States and that the title transfer at 
closing. 
Beyond this perception, Quail Cruises Ship Management Ltd. presents an 
interesting contradiction between the Morrison transactional test and the policy 
underlying Morrison against interfering with foreign securities regulation.280 The 
                                                          
277 Id. (emphasis in original). 
278 Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 291 (9th ed. 2009)). 
279 Id. This comports with the Second Circuit’s decision in Absolute Activist Value Master Fund 
Ltd., which considered the location where the title transferred in determining if a domestic 
transaction under Morrison had occurred. 677 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2012). 
280 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austr. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2886 (2010). The Court states that it 
developed a “clear test” to avoid the interference with foreign securities regulation that 
application of § 10(b) abroad would produce. Id. It seems counterintuitive then that a foreign-
cubed case would satisfy the transactional test.  
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Eleventh Circuit focused on applying the Morrison transactional test as literally 
adopted.281 The district court below, on the other hand, looked to Morrison’s 
policy rationale, determining that allowing the Section 10(b) claim in this setting 
would undermine congressional intent concerning the regulation of foreign 
transactions.282 By creating a test that ignores U.S. conduct and the U.S. 
connections of the parties, Morrison laid the groundwork for essentially foreign 
claims such as this to proceed.  
Nonetheless, the interpretation of “domestic transactions” that seems to best 
comport with Morrison and the Exchange Act is the irrevocable liability analysis. 
That analysis takes into account the statutory meaning of the words “purchase” and 
“sale” and does not revive aspects of the rejected conduct and effects test, as a 
focus on “solicitation” would. Though the facts needed to establish proof of 
irrevocable liability in a given situation frequently may not be clear, mutual 
                                                          
281 See Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt Ltd., 645 F.3d at 1310-11 (examining the transaction to 
determine if the transaction “occurred in the United States” as required under the Morrison 
transactional test). 
282 See Quail Cruises Ship Mgmt Ltd. v. Agencia de Viagens CVC Tur Limitada, 732 F. Supp. 
2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (stating that even if the transaction closed in the United States, the 
purchase or sale occurred abroad because, under Morrison, it is Congress’s intent, not the 




acceptance of the agreement’s terms and conditions in the United States should be 
important. As for whether parties can invoke U.S. federal securities law based on 
contractual language alone, it appears they cannot. They may, however, be able to 
opt into Section 10(b) coverage if contractual language provides that the closing 
and title transfer occur in the United States and the parties then perform 
accordingly. With that possibility looming, it seems that the transactional test may 
produce results that Morrison did not foresee. 
The last section considers private right of actions after Morrison and 
whether the emerging globalization of securities markets calls for action by 
Congress. 
C. The Ultimate Wave – Private Right of Actions After Morrison 
 In response to the study called for in the Dodd-Frank Act, parties ranging 
from foreign governments to pension funds to law professors have weighed in on 
whether Congress ought to reinstate some form of the conduct and effects test for 
private right of actions under Section 10(b).283 Most foreign governments argue 
                                                          
283 See, e.g., California State Teachers’ Retirement System et al., Comment in Response to SEC 
Release No. 34-63174 (Feb. 18, 2011) (group of sixteen pension funds); Jonathan Taylor, 
Managing Dir. Fin. Servs. & Stability, U.K., Comment in Response to SEC Release No. 34-
63174 (Feb. 11, 2011) (United Kingdom government); Robert P. Bartlett, III et al., Comment in 
Response to SEC Release No. 34-63174 (Feb. 18, 2011) (group of forty-two law professors). 
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that expanding Morrison would create conflicts with foreign law.284 For instance, 
unlike the United States, many European countries have not adopted or have 
limited class actions, have limited discovery, do not allow contingency fees, and 
require the loser to pay litigation costs.285 Rather, these countries have made 
deliberate decisions not to provide the same remedies as are available in the United 
States. Additionally, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Switzerland 
argue that expansion of Morrison is not necessary because each country has 
                                                          
284 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 283, at 9 (United Kingdom); Klaus Botzet, Legal Advisor and 
Consul General, F.R.G., Comment in Response to SEC Release No. 34-63174, at 2-3 (Feb. 18, 
2011) (Germany); Catherine Bergeal, La Directrice des Affaires Juridiques, Fr., Comment in 
Response to SEC Release No. 34-63174, at 2-3 (Feb. 17, 2011) (France).  See generally Marc I. 
Steinberg, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW (1998). 
285 See Taylor, supra note 283, at 2-3 (United Kingdom); Bergeal, supra note 284, at 4 (France). 
The comment by France even provided, “French courts would almost certainly refuse to enforce 
a court judgment in the U.S. ‘opt out’ class action because such a judgment violates French 
constitutional principles and public policy.” Id. at 7. For a detailed comparison of U.S. and 
foreign securities law, see the appendix of a comment by several European banking federations. 
Mouvement des Entreprises de France et al., Comment in Response to SEC Release No. 34-
63174, app. (Feb. 18, 2011). 
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remedies available to U.S. investors who invest in foreign markets.286 Several of 
the governments emphasize cooperation between regulating authorities as an 
effective way to deal with transnational securities.287 Overall, foreign governments 
advocate that the Section 10(b) private right of action should remain limited by 
Morrison. 
U.S. pension funds, on the other hand, advocate that Section 10(b) ought to 
extend to all purchases and sales of securities by financial institutions located in 
the United States and by individuals and entities who reside in the United States.288 
                                                          
286 Taylor, supra note 283, at 8-9 (United Kingdom); Bergeal, supra note 284, at 6-7 (France); 
Botzet, supra note 284, at 2-3 (Germany); Manuel Sager, Ambassador, Switz., Comment in 
Response to SEC Release No. 34-63174, at 2 (Feb. 22, 2011) (Switzerland). 
287 See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 283, at 7 (United Kingdom); Bergeal, supra note 284, at 8 
(France); Sager, supra note 286, at 3 (Switzerland). 
288 See California State Teachers’ Retirement System et al., supra note 283, at 1 (sixteen public 
pension funds from eleven different states managing $732 billion); Ohio Public Employees 
Retirement System et al., Comment in Response to SEC Release No. 34-63174, at 1-2 (Feb. 18, 
2011) (five Ohio public pension funds managing $162 billion); Thomas P. DiNapoli, State 
Comptroller, N.Y., Comment in Response to SEC Release No. 34-63174, at 1 (Feb. 18, 2011)  
(trustee of the $141 billion New York State Common Retirement Fund). Cf. Robbins Gellar 
Rudman & Dowd LLP, Comment in Response to SEC Release No. 34-63174, at 4 (Feb. 18, 
2011) (institutional investors of foreign pension funds worth $134 billion urging Congress to 
reinstate the conduct and effects test). 
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Five Ohio pension funds assert that U.S. and European Union brokers are required 
by legislation to execute purchases and sales on the exchange that, under the 
circumstances, most benefits the client.289 Investors therefore have no idea which 
exchange(s) their orders will be directed through.290 Additionally, many states 
mandate that state pension funds engage in prudent diversification.291 For some 
funds, this requires the purchase of securities on foreign exchanges.292 Several 
                                                          
289 Ohio Public Employees Retirement System et al., supra note 288, at 7.  
290 Id. at 7. See also National Association of Shareholder and Consumer Attorneys, Comment in 
Response to SEC Release No. 34-63174, at 21 (Feb. 18, 2011) (noting that the exchange used is 
not often under the investor’s control). 
291 See Ohio Public Employees Retirement System et al., supra note 288, at 7-8; DiNapoli, supra 
note 288, at 2. As of December 31, 2010, about 29% of the New York State Common Retirement 
Fund’s public equities were international, with most of them purchased on foreign exchanges. Id. 
at 2. 
292 See Ohio Public Employees Retirement System et al., supra note 288, at 8 (stating that “an 
investor seeking to have automotive industry representation simply cannot avoid buying Toyota 
or Volkswagon and cannot buy energy without purchasing BP or Royal Dutch Shell”). As an 
example of the potentially negative effects of Morrison, the trustee for the New York State 
Common Retirement Fund notes that the fund purchased BP shares on a foreign exchange and, 
thus, may not be able to continue its role as lead plaintiff against BP concerning 
misrepresentations about the recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. DiNapoli, supra note 288, at 
2-3. The trustee points out that 40% of BP’s assets and workers are in North America, that 40% 
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funds contend that a private right of action for U.S. investors, regardless of where 
the affected securities transaction(s) are consummated, is essential to effectuate the 
Exchange Act’s primary purpose of protecting investors.293 
 A comment by a group of forty-two law professors also supports extending 
Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Act to private plaintiffs.294 The professors argued 
that, with the fluid and international nature of modern financial markets, the place 
of a trade is becoming increasingly arbitrary.295 For instance, they predicted that 
the proposed merger of the Deutsche Borse and NYSE Euronext (which 
subsequently was scuttled) would result in offshore trades that, in the past, would 
have been executed in the United States.296 Rather than focus on where a trade 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of its ordinary shares are owned by U.S. investors, and that BP has two wholly-owned U.S. 
subsidiaries. Id. For a further discussion of Morrison’s impact on institutional investors, see 
Ward & Barket, supra note 267. 
293 See California State Teachers’ Retirement System et al., supra note 283, at 7-8, 14; Ohio 
Public Employees Retirement System et al., supra note 288, at 3-5. 
294 Bartlett, III et al., supra note 283, at 5. 
295 Id. at 7. 
296 Id. at 5-6. European officials have since blocked this deal, and the parent company of the 
NYSE has decided not to pursue the merger.   See  Jacob Bunge, NYSE-Deutsche Bὂrse Joins 
Dead-Deal List, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2012, at C2; Aaron Smith et al., NYSE-Frankfurt Stock 
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occurs, the group urged Congress to focus on where an investor is induced to 
trade.297 Additionally, when foreign issuers list their stock in the United States and 
voluntarily subject themselves to U.S. securities laws, as National Australia did in 
Morrison by offering ADRs on the NYSE, the group argued that concerns about 
international comity are minimized.298 Lastly, the professors pointed to the 
numerous dismissals of securities fraud cases since Morrison as evidence of its 
shortcomings.299 By comparison, they claimed that the conduct and effects test 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Exchange Merger Blocked, CNN MONEY (Feb. 1, 2012), 
money.cnn.com/2012/02/01/markets/nyse_euronext_deutsche_boerse/index.htm. 
297 Id. at 7 (arguing that “[i]f a person in the U.S. is approached by brokers in the U.S. and is led 
to execute a trade on a foreign exchange, surely that trade is territorial, not extraterritorial”). In 
urging the Commission to reflect on the benefits of reinstating the conduct and effects test, the 
professors suggest that the Commission consider “analogies to Regulation S’s ‘directed selling 
efforts’” and “the extent of trading in categories of economically equivalent instruments,” such 
as ADRs and swaps backed by foreign shares. Id. at 8. 
298 Id. at 8-10. The group of professors remarked that plaintiffs in Morrison did not emphasize 
these facts before the Supreme Court. Id. at 13. 
299 See id. at 13-18 (describing twelve cases dismissed or pending a motion to dismiss since 
Morrison). Many of the professors were also persuaded by the scenario painted by Justice 
Stevens in Morrison, where a retiree, after being sold doomed securities in a door-to-door sale by 
an executive of a foreign-owned U.S. subsidiary, might be barred from bringing a Section 10(b) 
action. Id. at 6. 
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“captures the potential complexity of the relationships among investors and 
issuers.”300  
 The Commission issued its report based on the Dodd-Frank study in April 
2012.301 Rather than recommend a particular course of action, the Commission put 
forth several alternatives regarding private right of actions for Congressional 
consideration.302 These alternatives ranged from extending the conduct and effects 
test that Congress granted the Commission and DOJ in the Dodd-Frank Act,303 to 
supplementing and clarifying the second prong of the Morrison transaction test,304 
                                                          
300 Id. at 11.  Note that one of the authors of this article, Marc I. Steinberg, joined this comment 
letter. 
301 See generally Study on the Cross-Border Scope of the Private Right of Action Under Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 62. 
302 Id. at 58-59. 
303 See id. at 60-64. The Commission offered variations on the conduct and effects test for private 
rights of actions, such as an additional requirement that “the plaintiff’s injury resulted directly 
from conduct within the United States” or that a U.S. investor brought the complaint. Id. at 60 
(emphasis in original). 
304 See id. at 64-69. Options presented for consideration included: 
1. Permit Investors to Pursue a Section 10(b) Private Action for the Purchase or Sale of 
any Security that Is of the Same Class of Securities Registered in the United States, 
Irrespective of the Actual Location of the Transaction 
. . . 
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to taking no action at all.305 Issuing a dissenting statement on the report, SEC 
Commissioner Luis Aguilar expressed his “strong disappointment,” citing the 
report’s lack of any specific recommendations and its failure to accurately portray 
the “immense and irreparable investor harm” resulting from Morrison.306 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2. Authorize Section 10(b) Private Actions Against Securities Intermediaries that 
Engage in Securities Fraud While Purchasing or Selling Securities Overseas for U.S. 
Investors 
. . . 
3. Permit Investors to Pursue a Section 10(b) Private Action if They Can Demonstrate 
that They Were Induced While in the United States to Engage in the Transaction, 
Irrespective of Where the Actual Transaction Occurred 
. . . 
4. Clarify that an Off-Exchange Transaction Takes Place in the United States if Either 
Party Made the Offer to Sell or Purchase, or Accepted the Offer to Sell or Purchase, 
While in the United States 
. . . . 
Id. at 64-68. 
305 See id. at 57-58 (noting that this approach would leave interpretation of Morrison to the 
courts). 
306 See Luis A. Aguilar, Statement by Commissioner: Defrauded Investors Deserve Their Day in 
Court, SECS. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch041112laa.htm (Apr. 11, 2012) 
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 In the SEC comments submitted by the various parties, the main 
disagreement appears to concern whether Section 10(b) coverage ought to be 
available to U.S. investors who purchased or sold securities of foreign issuers. In 
that situation, the United States has an interest in protecting U.S. investors, while a 
foreign government has an interest in policing issuers within its country. The 
American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law observes 
that, with the increasing globalization of securities markets, territorial factors may 
become less relevant.  Conversely, the place of representations and negotiations,307 
the nationality and residency of the parties,308 and the effect of the transaction or 
conduct on U.S. markets and investors309 become more important.310 Clearly, the 
locale of a transaction will become increasingly irrelevant if international exchange 
mergers become widespread. If the Exchange Act is to adequately protect U.S. 
investors and markets in the future, non-territorial factors, such as those set forth in 
the Restatement, must play a pivotal role in determining the scope of the Section 
                                                          
307 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 416(2)(b). 
308 Id. § 416(2)(c). This factor may be particularly important when seeking to protect members of 
the United States armed forces stationed abroad. Id. rptr. n.2. 
309 See id. § 416(2)(a) (considering “whether the transaction or conduct has, or can reasonably be 
expected to have, a substantial effect on a securities market in the United States for securities of 
the same issuer or on holdings in such securities by United States nationals or residents”). 
310 Id. § 416 cmt.a. 
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10(b) private right of action.311 For these reasons, Congress needs to reconsider the 
substantive scope of Section 10(b) as applied to transactions consummated abroad. 
VI. Conclusion 
Morrison has significant ramifications. Overall, the decision (1) altered the 
longstanding treatment of extraterritoriality as a jurisdictional issue; (2) rendered it 
more difficult to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality under federal 
law; and (3) dramatically narrowed the scope of Section 10(b) with respect to 
transnational frauds. The first two changes primarily have affected federal law 
outside of U.S. securities law. Statutory requirements are being scrutinized after 
Morrison to ensure that they are not incorrectly characterized as jurisdictional 
issues. Additionally, Morrison’s strict approach to the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is driving discussions where a statute’s extraterritorial reach is 
unsettled. It is the creation of the transactional test, however, that will have the 
most lasting reverberations on the legal tapestry.  
                                                          
311 Under the Restatement, it would be reasonable for the United States to exercise jurisdiction 
based on representations made in the United States and for the protection of a U.S. investor. See 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 416(2)(b)-(c), cmt. a. This is not to say that the 
application of foreign law would be inappropriate.  As in blue sky law, the transaction may have 
sufficient connection to both U.S. and foreign law to warrant application of either law. See 
Joseph C. Long, 12 BLUE SKY LAW § 4.1 (2010). 
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Both securities law and non-securities law have been impacted by the 
transactional test, but in very different ways. The focus in securities law will be 
gaining an understanding of what it means to have a “domestic transaction” under 
Morrison. This may entail development of the irrevocable liability analysis and 
possibly some incorporation of contract law concepts. On the whole, with respect 
to private rights of action, it can be said that the transactional test sets a much 
higher threshold for Section 10(b) claims than the now defunct conduct and effects 
test ever did. 
As for non-securities law, Morrison can be expected to guide the important 
development of the secondary tests that instruct courts as to the proper application 
of a statute. RICO is likely the first of many statutes to be examined by courts in 
accordance with the process set forth in Morrison. That is, the process of first 
identifying the focus of a statute based on its statutory language and legislative 
history and then creating a minimum-U.S.-contact test in accordance with that 
focus, all the while being mindful of the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
With the globalization of finance and business markets, ascertaining the requisite 
U.S. nexus under an applicable statute will become increasingly critical in 
discerning the boundaries of U.S. law.  
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